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Presumed Guilty
Terrence Cain1
Abstract
It would probably surprise the average American to learn that
prosecutors need only prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
sometimes. Although the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution
require that the government prove each element of an alleged criminal
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the use of statutory presumptions
has relieved the government of this responsibility, and in some cases,
has even shifted the burden to the defendant to disprove the
presumption. Likewise, the Sixth Amendment grants a criminal
defendant the right to have the jury and the jury alone determine
whether the government has met its burden and ultimately whether the
person is guilty or not. By legislative fiat, statutory presumptions have
taken the place of proof, and as a consequence, usurped the jury’s role
as the ultimate authority on whether the prosecution has satisfied its
burden of proof. These presumptions violate the constitutional
guarantees of the right to have the government prove each element of
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to have a jury find
all facts necessary to convict. The Supreme Court has heard this
argument before and rejected it. It has not, however, reconsidered it in
the aftermath of its decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, Blakely v.
Washington, and United States v. Booker. These cases breathed much
needed new life into the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee, and in
the process put an end to a two decade legislative encroachment on the
1

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H.
Bowen School of Law. The following persons at the law school where I am honored
and fortunate to teach provided valuable support and guidance as I wrote this Article:
Jada Aitchison, Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Coleen Miller Barger, Theresa M. Beiner, Jessie
Wallace Burchfield, Paula Casey, John M.A. DiPippa, A. Felecia Epps, Frances S.
Fendler, Kathryn C. Fitzhugh, Michael T. Flannery, Lynn Foster, Kenneth S. Gallant,
Charles W. Goldner, Jr., Kenneth S. Gould, Lindsey P. Gustafson, Sarah Howard
Jenkins-Hobbs, Philip D. Oliver, Ranko Shiraki Oliver, Kelly Browe Olson, Melissa
M. Serfass, Joshua M. Silverstein, J. Thomas Sullivan, and Kelly S. Terry. I also want
to thank former students Kristen Green and Amy J. Silvoso for serving as sounding
boards as I worked on this Article. Finally, I am grateful to the Southeastern
Association of Law Schools and the Law and Society Association for allowing me to
present this Article at conferences. Any errors or omissions in this Article are solely
the responsibility of the author.

1
© 2013 West Services, Inc.

Criminal Law Bulletin

11/11/2014 2:11 PM

jury’s historic function as the sole arbiter of whether the government
has proved all the essential facts necessary to convict a person of a
crime. Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker cast doubt on the validity of
statutory presumptions in criminal cases. This Article will explain why
that is so.

INTRODUCTION
American popular culture, particularly television, plays some
role in familiarizing the general public about how certain aspects of the
country’s legal system function. For example, a significant segment of
the television watching public can probably recite the Miranda2
warnings to the letter.3 Perhaps a smaller, but still large cohort of the
American public likely knows that in criminal cases the prosecution
must prove the defendant’s guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”4 It is
2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). Miranda requires that prior to
questioning a suspect, law enforcement inform the person “that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used against him, and that he has a
right to an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
3
Joshua A. Engel, Frequent Flyers at the Court: The Supreme Court Begins to Take
the Experience of Criminal Defendants Into Account in Miranda Cases, 7 Seton Hall
Cir. Rev. 303, 309 n.25 (2011) (citing United States v. Harris, 515 F.3d 1307, 1311
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (“every television viewer knows an officer may not interrogate a
suspect who is in custody without informing her of her Miranda rights”); United
States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 439 n.4 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Miranda Warnings”
“commonly used in court and in television shows to describe the ritual prescribed in
Miranda v. Arizona”); United States v. Lacy, No. 2:09-CR-45 TS, 2010 WL 1451344,
at *2 (D. Utah, Apr. 8, 2010) (“defendant aware of his Miranda rights because of
television”); Russell Dean Covey, Miranda and the Media: Tracing the Cultural
Evolution of a Constitutional Revolution, 10 Chap. L. Rev. 761, 761 (2007)
(“television made the Miranda warnings famous”).
4
The Supreme Court did not expressly state that the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard is constitutionally required in criminal cases until 1970. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Although Winship is the first case where the Court “explicitly”
said that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a constitutional requirement in
criminal cases, from 1881 to 1954 the Court assumed as much. Winship, 397 U.S. at
362 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1954); Holland v. United States,
348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949); Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 56970 (1914); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910); Davis v. United States,
160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895); Miles v.
United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881)).
The Court stated without citation that the “beyond a reasonable doubt formulation
occurred as late as 1798.” Winship, 397 U.S. at 361. Ironically, Winship is not a
criminal case. Winship, 397 U.S. at 359. The question in the case was whether a
juvenile who has been charged with an offense that would constitute a crime if he was
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likely, however, that far fewer people know that in some cases, the
prosecution can obtain a conviction without actually having to prove
important aspects of its case. Those cases involve the use of statutory
presumptions.
Legislatures enacted statutory presumptions primarily to make it
easier for prosecutors to convict defendants.5 The following example
demonstrates how a typical presumption in the criminal law works.6
Assume a person is charged with possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute.7 The offense has two elements: (1) possession of marijuana;
and (2) the intent to distribute the marijuana to someone else. 8 The
statute forming the basis of the prosecution says that if a person
possesses one or more grams of marijuana he9 is presumed to have the
intent to distribute it, but he can overcome that presumption by
presenting enough evidence to create a reasonable doubt as to whether
he actually intended to distribute it.10
Normally, to convict this defendant, the state must prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, which means
proving that the defendant possessed the marijuana and intended to
distribute it.11 The statutory presumption, however, gives the prosecutor
a powerful advantage. If he proves the first element, (i.e., the defendant
possessed a gram or more of marijuana), the statute instructs the finder
of fact to presume the second element (i.e., the defendant intended to
distribute the marijuana), unless the defendant produces evidence that
creates a reasonable doubt that he actually intended to distribute the
marijuana. As a practical matter, this requires the defendant to prove a
an adult is entitled to have the government prove he committed the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory stage. Winship, 397 U.S. at 359, 365-68.
A defendant in a criminal case is not required to “put on a case,” i.e., he is entitled to
rely solely on the presumption of innocence and the government’s accompanying
duty to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S.
73, 87 n.16 (1983).
5
Joseph P. Chamberlain, Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney, 14
A.B.A. J. 287, 287 (1928); Note, Statutory Presumptions as Devices to Facilitate the
Proof of Crimes, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 489 (1928) [hereinafter Note] (“In order to
more easily enforce the criminal law and to make the conviction of the guilty more
certain, the legislatures in nearly every jurisdiction have found it convenient to
declare what facts shall be sufficient in many situations to make out a prima facie
case of guilt.”).
6
Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due
Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale L.J. 165, 172 (1969).
7
Ashford & Risinger, supra note 6, at 172.
8
Ashford & Risinger, supra note 6, at 172.
9
Generic uses of “he,” “him,” and “his” include “she,” “her,” and “hers.”
10
Ashford & Risinger, supra note 6, at 172.
11
In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
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negative (i.e., he did not intend to distribute the marijuana).12 If he does
not present any evidence, he will be convicted without the prosecution
having to do anything more than prove he possessed more than one
gram of marijuana.
Presumptions have been the subject of constitutional challenges
since at least 1893,13 principally on the ground that they relieve the
prosecution of its burden of proving every element of an offense
beyond a reasonable doubt,14 or they shift the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defendant.15 The Court’s presumption jurisprudence
has created a considerable amount of commentary.16 Some of that
12

Ashford & Risinger, supra note 6, at 172-73. This is referred to as shifting the
burden of “production,” i.e., the responsibility of producing “some” evidence to rebut
the presumption, to the defense. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517-19 (1979).
In criminal cases, the burden of “persuasion,” i.e., the responsibility of proving the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, always rests with the government.
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 517-19, 524. Shifting the burden of persuasion to a criminal
defendant is forbidden under the Due Process Clause. Sandstrom, 445 U.S. at 517-19,
524.
13
Aimee Fukuchi, Note, A Balance of Convenience: The Use of Burden-Shifting
Devices in Criminal Cyberharrassment Law, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 289, 311 (2011); Leslie
J. Harris, Constitutional Limits on Criminal Presumptions as an Expression of
Changing Concepts of Fundamental Fairness, 77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 308, 308
n.1 (1986) (citing Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36 (1896); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U.S. 172 (1893)).
14
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 215 (1977).
15
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520-24; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698-701 (1975).
16
The following is merely a sample: Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decision
Making in Criminal Cases: A Unified Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 321 (1980); Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to
Booker: Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 195
(2005); Ashford & Risinger, supra note 6; Ralph C. Barnhart, Use of Presumptions in
Arkansas, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 128 (1950); Peter D. Bewley, Note, The Unconstitutionality
of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 341 (1970); Francis H. Bohlen,
The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. Pa.
L. Rev. (1920); Paul Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 Tul. L. Rev. 17 (1930);
David N. Brown, The Constitutionality of Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev.
141 (1967); Chamberlain, supra note 5; David D. Cook, Note, Presumptive Intent
Jury Instructions After Sandstrom, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 366 (1980); Edward J.
Frattaroli, Note, Abrogation of Criminal Statutory Presumptions, 5 Suffolk U. L. Rev.
161 (1970); Allen Fuller & Robert Urich, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of
Statutory Presumptions That Lessen the Burden of the Prosecution, 25 U. Miami L.
Rev. 420 (1970); Theodore A. Gottfried & Peter G. Baroni, Presumptions, Inferences
and Strict Liability in Illinois Criminal Law: Preempting the Presumption of
Innocence?, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 715 (2008); Michael H. Graham, Burden of Proof
and Presumptions in Criminal Cases, 44 Crim. L. Bull. (2009); William G. Hale,
Comment, Necessity of Logical Inference to Support a Presumption, 17 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 48 (1943); Leslie J. Harris, supra note 13; John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B.
Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88
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commentary says that the use of statutory presumptions violates the
Constitution, and the following three relatively recent Supreme Court
cases can be read to support that thesis: Apprendi v. New Jersey;17
Blakely v. Washington;18 and United States v. Booker.19
Apprendi held that a criminal defendant has a Fourteenth
Amendment right to have the prosecution prove every element of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt and a Sixth Amendment right to
have a jury decide if that proof has been met, including finding facts
that might increase his sentence if he is found guilty. 20 Blakely held that
“other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
[proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.]”21 Finally, Booker held
that a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when a judge enhances a
sentence based on his own findings of fact and not on facts found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.22
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker reasserted the principle that the
jury is the sole finder of fact in criminal prosecutions and suggest that a
prosecutor cannot obtain a conviction by simply proving one element
of an offense and then relying on a statutory presumption to take care
of any remaining elements. 23 The use of statutory presumptions
encroaches on the jury’s historic function as the sole arbiter of whether
the prosecution has proved each element of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. The proper way for the government to convict a
person of a crime is to present proof of each element of the crime to a
Yale L.J. 1325 (1979); W. Page Keeton, Statutory Presumptions – Their
Constitutionality and Legal Effect, 10 Tex. L. Rev. 34 (1931); Charles V. Laughlin,
In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 195 (1953);
Edmund M. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof,
47 Harv. L. Rev. 59 (1933); Edmund M. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning
Presumptions, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 906 (1931); Edmund M. Morgan, Tot v. United
States: Constitutional Restrictions on Statutory Presumptions, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1324
(1943); Roy R. Ray, Presumptions and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 33 Tex. L.
Rev. 588 (1955); Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice:
Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 Yale L.J. 1299 (1977); Note,
Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 527
(1955); Presumptions as Devices, supra note 5.
17
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
18
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
19
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
20
Apprendi, 503 U.S. at 490-92.
21
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301-02, 305-08.
22
Booker, 543 U.S. at 228-29, 243-44.
23
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) (“Where intent of the
accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence is a question of fact [that]
must be submitted to the jury.”).
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jury; the jury makes findings with respect to each element; and it makes
those findings beyond a reasonable doubt.24 The purpose of this Article
is to show that the current use of statutory presumptions does not
comport with this process.
Part I of this Article traces and critiques the lengthy and
confusing development of the Supreme Court’s presumption
jurisprudence from the Nineteenth Century through the cases that form
the Court’s current doctrine. Part II examines how statutory criminal
presumptions might fare in the face of a constitutional challenge
premised on Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.

I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE
A. What are Statutory Presumptions and What Purpose do They Serve?
To obtain a conviction in a criminal case, the government has to
prove its case “beyond a reasonable doubt.”25 This is a high hurdle to
clear, and it is so for a number of reasons. 26 First, it makes it less likely
that a person will be convicted based on factual errors and provides
substantive meaning to the presumption that a person is innocent until
the government proves him guilty. 27 Second, because a conviction can
result in execution, incarceration, or stigmatization, society demands
that a person’s life not be taken, liberty not be lost, or reputation not be
tarnished where reasonable doubt exists as to his guilt. 28 Third,
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt instills in the citizenry the
confidence that a person will not lose his life, liberty, or good name
without first being found guilty with “utmost certainty.” 29 These
principles form the core of the criminal process. 30
An important corollary to these majestic pronouncements exists,
however, which is that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard makes it
more difficult for prosecutors to obtain convictions and increases the
risk that a guilty person will go free. 31 In response to this, many states
24

Morissette, 342 U.S. at 274 (quoting People v. Flack, 125 N.Y. 324, 334, 26 N.E.
267, 270 (1891)).
25
Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
26
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64.
27
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (citing Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453).
28
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64 (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 525-26).
29
Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
30
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363; Winship, 397 U.S. at 327 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“it is
far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free”).
31
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208.
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embodied in their criminal statutes what are known as “presumptions,”
and did so in part to make it easier for prosecutors to convict
defendants.32 Popular culture has not done much—if anything—to
inform the population at large of this aspect of the judicial system.
Generally, there are three types of presumptions: (1) conclusive;
(2) mandatory; and (3) permissive.33 Under a conclusive presumption,
once a fact is proved, one is not allowed to dispute a fact presumed to
flow from the proven fact.34 Under a mandatory presumption, if a fact
is proved, one is required to accept a presumed fact flowing from the
proven fact if the presumed fact is not rebutted.35 Under a permissive
presumption, once a fact is proved, one is allowed, but not required, to
accept a presumed fact flowing from the proven fact.36
In a troika of cases decided between 1979 and 1985, the
Supreme Court articulated the current framework courts are to use
when deciding whether a presumption violates the Constitution. 37 First,
a court must determine whether the presumption is mandatory or
permissive.38 It is mandatory if the finder of fact is told that he is

32

Chamberlain, supra note 5, at 287; Note, supra note 5, at 489.
Bewley, supra note 16, at 342.
34
Bewley, supra note 16, at 342. For example, if an official government document
states that an item weighs a certain amount, the actual weight of the item is presumed
to be the weight stated on the document. Bewley, supra note 16, at 342 n.14 (citing
Vega S.S. Co. v. Consol. Elevator Co., 75 Minn. 308, 311-12, 77 N.W. 973, 974
(1899)). One is allowed to dispute the legitimacy of the government document itself,
but if the finder of fact believes the document is legitimate, he is required to accept
the weight stated on the document. Bewley, supra note 16, at 342 n.14 (citing Vega
S.S. Co., 75 Minn. at 311-12, 77 N.W. at 974).
35
Bewley, supra note 16, at 342, 343. For example, if a person properly stamps,
addresses, and mails a letter, receipt of that letter will be presumed, and the
presumption will be mandatory. Bewley, supra note 16, at 343 n.15 (citing John E.
Stumbo, Presumptions – A View at Chaos, 3 Washburn L.J. 182, 189 (1964)) (If,
however, the intended recipient disputes receipt but cannot prove non-receipt, the
presumption of receipt “becomes conclusive.”); Bewley, supra note 16, at 343 n.15
(citing Stumbo, supra note 35, at 189). On the other hand, if the intended recipient
does prove non-receipt, the presumption will fail notwithstanding proof of proper
postage, addressing, and mailing. Bewley, supra note 16, at 343 n.15 (citing Stumbo,
supra note 135, at 189).
36
Bewley, supra note 16, at 343.
37
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 510; Cnty. Ct. of
Ulster Cnty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). University of Miami Law Professor
Michael H. Graham describes these decisions as “less than well[-]reasoned[,] partially
inconsistent, [and] unfortunately confusing.” Graham, supra note 16.
38
Francis, 471 U.S. at 313, 314 (citing Allen, 442 U.S. at 157-63; Speiser, 357 U.S. at
514, 520-24).
33

7

Criminal Law Bulletin

11/11/2014 2:11 PM

required to accept a presumed fact flowing from a proven fact.39 It is
permissive if the finder of fact is allowed, but not required, to accept a
presumed fact flowing from a proven fact.40 Mandatory presumptions
violate the Due Process Clause if they relieve the prosecution of its
burden of proving every element of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.41 A permissive presumption is constitutional so long as it
requires the prosecution to prove to the finder of fact that a presumed
fact should be accepted based on proof of a “predicate fact.”42 If,
however, acceptance of the presumed fact is not reasonable or cannot
be justified in light of the proven fact, the permissive presumption is
unconstitutional. 43 If an instruction to a finder of fact read in isolation
would lead a reasonable person to believe that the prosecution is not
required to prove an element of an offense, the instruction has to be
considered in light of other instructions given before a court can
conclude that the presumption is unconstitutional. 44
B. Presumptions as Rules of Evidence
The Supreme Court first addressed a constitutional challenge to
a statutory presumption in 1893 when it upheld the constitutionality of
the “Geary Act,” which Congress passed on May 5, 1892 to prohibit
Chinese immigration into the United States.45 Section Six of the Act
required that “Chinese laborers” present in the country as of May 5,
1892 obtain a “certificate of residence” from the “collector of internal
revenue” by May 5, 1893.46 If a Chinese laborer did not obtain a
certificate of residence, Section Six of the Act required his arrest and a

39

Francis, 471 U.S. at 314 n.2 (citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 517-18). A mandatory
presumption can be conclusive or rebuttable. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314 n.2. Conclusive
presumptions remove presumed elements from the case once the State proves what is
necessary to trigger the presumption. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314 n.2. Rebuttable
presumptions require the jury to find the presumed element unless the defendant
convinces it not to. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314 n.2. (citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 51718).
40
Francis, 471 U.S. at 314.
41
Francis, 471 U.S. at 314 (citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520-24; Patterson, 432
U.S. at 210, 215; Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-701). Francis declined to answer the
question of whether a mandatory presumption that shifts the burden of production to a
defendant violates the Due Process Clause. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314 n.3.
42
Francis, 471 U.S. at 314.
43
Francis, 471 U.S. at 314-15 (citing Allen, 442 U.S. at 157-63).
44
Francis, 471 U.S. at 315 (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (1973)).
45
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 698-99 n.1.
46
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 699-700 n.1.
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judicial declaration that his presence in the country is unlawful. 47 The
Act required a federal judge to enter a deportation order unless the
laborer produced “clear” and “[satisfactory]” evidence that he did not
obtain a certificate because of “accident, sickness, or other unavoidable
cause.”48 The laborer also had to have “at least one credible white
witness” testify that he [the laborer] lived in the country on May 5,
1892.49
Three Chinese laborers were arrested under the Act and
challenged the validity of Section Six. 50 The Court held that the
presumption in Section Six that a person arrested for not having a
certificate was presumed to be in the country illegally did not create a
conclusive presumption, rather it represented “prima facie” evidence
that the laborer was unlawfully in the United States.51 The laborer
could rebut this presumption by appearing before a federal judge and
proving that he had just cause for not obtaining a certificate and having
a white witness testify that he resided in the United States on May 5,
1892.52 The Court held that Congress had the authority to “prescribe
the evidence [that] shall be received, and the effect of that evidence, in
the courts of its own government.”53 The Court went on to hold that the
judicial proceeding contemplated by Section Six of the Act did not
constitute a criminal trial, therefore, the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment
right to due process, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments did
not apply. 54 Fong Yue Ting left open the question of whether the burden
shifting allowed in a judicial proceeding under Section Six of the Act
would be permissible in a conventional criminal case. The Court’s next
presumption case, Wilson v. United States,55 went a step in the direction
of answering that question.

47

Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 699-700 n.1.
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 699-700 n.1.
49
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 699-700 n.1. The Act further provided that if the
“Chinaman” lost his certificate or had it stolen, he would be detained for a reasonable
time in order to obtain a duplicate certificate. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 699-700
n.1.
50
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 698-99, 704.
51
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 727.
52
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 727.
53
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 729 (citations omitted).
54
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
55
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
48
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On May 15, 1895, a jury convicted Mr. Wilson56 of murder and
sentenced him to be hanged. 57 During his trial, the prosecution
introduced evidence that on the day of his arrest, authorities found
several items of property belonging to the decedent in his possession.58
The trial court instructed the jury that if a person suspected of
committing a murder is found with the victim’s property in his
possession, the suspect is presumed guilty of the murder unless he
proves that his possession of that property is “innocent and honest.”59
The Supreme Court held that evidence that a defendant possessed the
“fruits” of a recently committed crime justified the inference that the
defendant is guilty of the crime unless the defendant explained his
innocence.60 The Court pointed out that the trial court left it up to the
jury to “draw the inference” that Mr. Wilson committed the murder if
he failed to “satisfactorily explain” the physical evidence the State
introduced at his trial. 61 The Court did not, however, address the issue
of a jury instruction that required Mr. Wilson explain why he had the
decedent’s property in his possession on the pain of being presumed
guilty if he did not. This instruction not only shifted a burden of
persuasion62 to Mr. Wilson in that it placed an affirmative duty on him
to prove his possession of the decedent’s property was “innocent and
honest,” but it also amounted to a mandatory presumption in that it
required the jury to presume him guilty if he offered no explanation.
The Wilson Court did not conduct a constitutional analysis of
the challenged jury instructions.63 It affirmed the trial court’s use of the
instructions on the basis of the evidentiary principles of relevance and
56

Neither the case caption nor the text of the opinion says what Mr. Wilson’s first
name is.
57
Wilson, 162 U.S. at 613-14.
58
Wilson, 162 U.S. at 614-15.
59
Wilson, 162 U.S. at 616-17.
60
Wilson, 162 U.S. at 619-21.
61
Wilson, 162 U.S. at 620. The Court said that the bloodstained linens on Mr.
Wilson’s bed constituted “relevant, admissible evidence” that a violent, deadly act
was inflicted on the person connected with those linens, and if Mr. Wilson did not
explain why the linens were soaked in blood, the jury should infer that a murder
occurred. Wilson, 162 U.S. at 620.
62
There is a meaningful difference between the burden of persuasion and the burden
of production. Underwood, supra note 16, at 1300 n.3. When a party bears the burden
of production on an issue, the judge rather than the jury decides if the party has met
that burden. Allen & Hastert, supra note 16, at 203 n.46 (citing Allen, supra note 16,
at 329). If the burden of production on an issue is met, the party bearing the burden of
persuasion will lose that issue unless he produces enough evidence to convince the
jury otherwise. Underwood, supra note 16, at 1300 n.3.
63
Wilson, 162 U.S. at 619-21.
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admissibility. 64 After Fong Yue Ting and Wilson, the rule on criminal
presumptions seemed to be that if the prosecution produces prima facie
evidence of a defendant’s guilt, a jury is allowed to conclude that the
defendant is guilty unless he puts forth evidence that negates his guilt
or explains to the satisfaction of the jury why the prima facie evidence
should not be accepted as evidence of guilt. 65 Neither case, however,
examined presumptions for their constitutional validity.
C. The Constitutional Standard for Statutory Criminal Presumptions
Adams v. New York is the first case in which the Court
considered whether a criminal presumption violated the Constitution.66
A jury convicted Albert Adams for possessing gambling paraphernalia
known as “policy slips.”67 New York statutory law made possession of
policy slips by someone other than a public official “presumptive
evidence” that the person possessed the slips unlawfully. 68 The
Supreme Court held that one should presume that a person found
possessing policy slips possessed them unlawfully, unless he offered an
explanation to the contrary. 69 The Court said that evidence of
possession of the slips represented only prima facie evidence of guilt
that the statute “permitted” a defendant to rebut.70 The Court cited
Fong Yue Ting for the proposition that legislatures have the authority to
prescribe rules of evidence, and in Mr. Adams’s case, New York’s
legislature acted within that authority.71
The Adams Court did not conduct a very detailed or complex
constitutional analysis with respect to statutory presumptions in
criminal cases. Moreover, its citation to Fong Yue Ting is curious given
the Court’s holding in that case that the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause did not even apply to the petitioners’ claims.72 Adams presented
64

Wilson, 162 U.S. at 619-21.
Wilson, 162 U.S. at 619-21; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 727-32.
66
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
67
Adams, 192 U.S. at 586. People of that era used policy slips to play the illegal
“game of policy,” which operated like a lottery. Adams, 192 U.S. at 588. Players
would purchase policy slips with numbers on them representing the players’ guess as
to what numbers would be “drawn” later in the day. Adams, 192 U.S. at 588. When
the drawing took place, if a player had the right number, he would receive the money
paid for that day’s slips. Adams, 192 U.S. at 588.
68
Adams, 192 U.S. at 586-87.
69
Adams, 192 U.S. at 599.
70
Adams, 192 U.S. at 599.
71
Adams, 192 U.S. at 599 (citing Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 698-729).
72
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730-31. Fong Yue Ting involved the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Fourteenth’s because the petitioners
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the Court with an opportunity to articulate a standard that statutory
presumptions in criminal cases must satisfy in order to pass
constitutional muster, but it did not do so.73 Instead, it assessed the
presumptions in terms of the rules of evidence and a legislature’s power
to enact such rules.74 Adams left unanswered what limit, if any, the
Constitution places on a legislature’s power to enact statutory
presumptions. In 1910, a dispute between a railroad company and the
administrator of a decedent’s estate presented the Court with an
opportunity to provide that answer.75
Ray Hicks, a foreman for a railroad company, died when a
derailed train fell on him. 76 His estate sued the railroad and obtained a
judgment in a Mississippi trial court.77 The railroad appealed to the
Supreme Court and argued that a Mississippi railroad liability statute
that imputed negligence to railroads violated the Equal Protection
Clause.78 The Court responded by saying that the statute established
prima facie evidence only, statutes like Mississippi’s were rules of
evidence legislatures had the power to enact, and the validity of such
statutes had withstood numerous challenges.79 The Court found that the
rule created a “temporary inference” of negligence, which “cast upon
the railroad company the duty of producing some evidence to the
contrary.”80 If a railroad fulfilled this duty, a jury would decide the
ultimate issue of negligence; if not, the defendant would lose because
in civil cases, prima facie evidence is sufficient for a plaintiff to
prevail. 81
The Court concluded that the statute did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause. 82 The Court reached the
due process issue even though neither party raised it. It also did what it
had previously not done; it announced a standard that statutory
challenged acts of the Federal government. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161,
167 (2002) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United
States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States,
from depriving any person of [life, liberty, or,] property without ‘due process of
law.’”).
73
Adams, 192 U.S. at 598-99.
74
Adams, 192 U.S. at 599.
75
Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
76
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 41.
77
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 39.
78
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 41-42.
79
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 42. One of the cases the Court cited as a “leading” case on
this point is Adams, 192 U.S. 585. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 42.
80
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43.
81
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43.
82
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43.
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presumptions must satisfy in order to comply with the Constitution.83
The Court said that statutory presumptions satisfy due process if there
is some “rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed, and the inference from one fact from proof of another is
not so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.”84 Turnipseed
is a landmark case because it represented the Court’s first articulation
of a constitutional standard for assessing the validity of presumptions.
Given the novelty of what it did, however, it is arguable that the
Court went further than it should have. The Court equalized the
standard for judging criminal and civil statutory presumptions.85 This is
problematic for at least two reasons.
First, Turnipseed is a civil tort case, not a criminal case, and in
civil cases, the stakes for a defendant are far less grave than they are for
a defendant in a criminal case. After all, a tort defendant will not be
executed or imprisoned if he loses a lawsuit. On the other hand, a
criminal defendant’s life or liberty is on the line; therefore, the
standards for conviction should be considerably higher than the
standards a tort plaintiff must satisfy in order to obtain a judgment. The
distinction between a civil defendant and a criminal defendant are
substantial enough that the Court should have considered subjecting
statutory presumptions in criminal cases to a more rigorous level of
judicial scrutiny than a mere “rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed.”
Second, the “rational connection” language the Turnipseed
Court used is similar to the “rational basis” standard the Court uses in
its Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Legislation subject to a
rational basis standard is presumptively valid and will withstand a
constitutional challenge as long as it is “rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”86 This is a very easy standard to meet. In fact,
83

Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43.
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43.
85
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43.
86
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985) (citations
omitted). Legislation that classifies persons by race, alienage, or national origin, or
that impinges on a fundamental right is subject to the most searching form of judicial
examination, strict scrutiny, which means the legislation is unconstitutional unless the
government proves it is necessary to fulfill an important government interest and the
means chosen to fulfill that interest are narrowly tailored. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. at 440 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)). Strict scrutiny is so exacting and legislation
subject to it so rarely survives a constitutional challenge that it has been described as
“strict in theory, but fatal in fact.” City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.,
84
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the Court has said that it will uphold government action subject to a
rational basis standard if there is “any conceivable” rationale for it, and
the government is not required to state what that rationale is.87
Legislative action regarding burdens of production88 in the
criminal procedure arena, however, should have to meet a more
rigorous standard because state action that impinges on a fundamental
right is unconstitutional unless it is necessary to fulfill a compelling
government interest and the means chosen to fulfill that interest are
narrowly tailored. 89 A right is considered “fundamental” if it is “deeply
rooted in the history and tradition of the country,”90 or it is “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if it was sacrificed.”91
In re Winship observed that the right of a criminal defendant to
require the government to prove “every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged beyond a reasonable doubt” became a
part of this country’s law in 1798,92 which strongly suggests that this is
a fundamental right rooted in “history and tradition.” Statutory criminal
presumptions substantially affect this right because they make it easier
for the government to obtain convictions.93 Because of this, legislatures
should have to demonstrate that these presumptions are more than
merely “rational” or not “a purely arbitrary mandate.”94
D. Application of the Constitutional Standard
concurring in judgment)). Government classifications based on sex or illegitimacy are
subject to a heightened standard of review, but not strict scrutiny. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440-41. Such laws are constitutional if they are “substantially related
to an important governmental interest.” Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 441 (citing
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976)).
87
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (citing Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450
U.S. 662, 702-06 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)).
88
See Underwood, supra note 16, at 1300 n.3. for an elaboration on the definitions of
the burden of production and the burden of persuasion.
89
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440 (citing Graham, 403 U.S. 365; McLaughlin,
379 U.S. at 192).
90
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
91
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)).
92
In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361.
93
See supra note 5.
94
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 41.
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Fifteen days after Turnipseed, the Court invalidated a statutory
criminal presumption for the first time in Bailey v. Alabama.95 Bailey
involved a challenge to an Alabama statute that made it a crime to
terminate a written contract for services without just cause and without
refunding any money paid to render the services. 96 Terminating such a
contract coupled with a refusal to repay constituted prima facie
evidence of an intent to “injure or defraud” the employer.97 The Court
invalidated the law on the ground that an intent to defraud could not be
presumed based on a breach of contract and an accompanying debt.98
Criminalizing the failure to render services or repay debts amounted to
compulsory servitude, which violated the Thirteenth Amendment.99
Because the Court invalidated the statute on Thirteenth Amendment
grounds, it did not reach the question of whether the law violated due
process.100
Following Bailey, the Court decided two more cases in which
parties argued that certain statutory presumptions violated the standard
established in Turnipseed, and in each case, the Court rejected the

95

Bailey, 219 U.S. 219.
Bailey, 219 U.S. at 227-28 (citing 1907 Ala. Acts 636 (amending Ala. Code § 4730
(1896)). The statute required that the person act “with intent to injure or defraud his
employer.” Bailey, 219 U.S. at 227-28.
97
Bailey, 219 U.S. at 228-29.
98
Bailey, 219 U.S. at 234-35 (citing Bailey, 161 Ala. at 78, 49 So. at 887).
99
Bailey, 219 U.S. at 239-45. Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment says,
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. amend XIII, § 1. Mr. Bailey was a
black man, but the Court “dismissed” this fact from its consideration. Bailey, 219 U.S.
at 231.
100
Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245.
96
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challenge.101 That changed in 1916 in McFarland v. American Sugar
Refining Co.102
The American Sugar Refining Company obtained a court order
enjoining the enforcement of a Louisiana regulation stating that any
sugar refinery located in the State of Louisiana that paid the state less
for sugar than it paid any other state would be presumed to be “a party
to a monopoly or combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade and
commerce.”103 The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
injunction.104 The Court said a legislature could not “declare an
individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.” 105 This marked
the first time the Court declared a presumption unconstitutional using
the Turnipseed standard. Like Turnipseed, American Sugar is not a
criminal case, thus it remained to be seen how rigorously the Court
would apply American Sugar’s admonition to legislatures that they
could not “declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a
crime.”106 Hawes v. Georgia provided the Court that opportunity. 107
The State of Georgia indicted Robert Hawes (“Mr. Hawes”) for
knowingly allowing a “still” to be on his property.108 Under Georgia
law, the discovery of a still on one’s property constituted prima facie
evidence that the owner of the property knew the still was there.109 The
law explicitly placed the burden of proof on the owner to disprove he
knew it was on his property.110 The trial court instructed the jury that if
the government proved it discovered the still on Mr. Hawes’s property
101

Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 19-22, 25-28 (1913) (upheld a federal law that
declared if an “alien” who obtained a “certificate of citizenship” returned to his native
country or went to another country for the purpose of becoming a permanent resident
within five years of obtaining the certificate, the fact that he did so would be prima
facie evidence that when he obtained the certificate he never intended on becoming a
permanent resident of the United States, therefore, his certificate would be cancelled);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 81-83 (1911) (upheld a New
York statute that said, “in proceedings for [the] enforcement of [an environmental
protection statute], the fact that one who, for the purpose of collecting and vending
gas as a separate commodity, engages in pumping water from wells bored or drilled
into the rock, is prima facie evidence of being within the prohibition of the statute
[that makes such drilling unlawful], and [bears the burden of producing proof] that he
comes within an exception [to the law.]).
102
McFarland v. Am. Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916).
103
McFarland, 241 U.S. at 81.
104
McFarland, 241 U.S. at 85-86.
105
McFarland, 241 U.S. at 86.
106
McFarland, 241 U.S. at 86.
107
Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922).
108
Hawes, 258 U.S. at 2.
109
Hawes, 258 U.S. at 2.
110
Hawes, 258 U.S. at 2.
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and he did not disprove that he knew it was there, it “should” find him
guilty as charged.111 The Supreme Court concluded that a rational
connection existed between the discovery of alcohol distilling
equipment on his property and the presumption that he knew about the
equipment being on his property.112
It is difficult to reconcile Hawes with Bailey v. Alabama,113
which held that a statutory criminal presumption is not valid simply
because it does not require a jury to convict upon proof of a predicate
fact and a presumption flowing from that fact.114 Such a law is still
problematic if it authorizes a jury to convict based on a tenuous link
between the proven fact and the presumed fact.115 Hawes cited Bailey,
but nevertheless concluded the link between the proven fact (i.e., the
discovery of alcohol distilling equipment on Mr. Hawes’s property) and
the presumed fact (i.e., he had knowledge of the equipment being on
his property) was not so attenuated as to make the presumption
irrational. 116
And while Hawes also cited McFarland v. American Sugar
Refining Co.,117 which held that a legislature cannot simply “declare an
individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime,” 118 the Court did
not consider the question of whether Georgia’s law effectively
presumed Mr. Hawes guilty. The Court ended up ratifying a jury
instruction that said all the prosecution had to do was prove the
equipment was on Mr. Hawes’s property and “stop there.”119 If Mr.
Hawes did not then prove his ignorance of the equipment’s presence on
his property, the trial court instructed the jury that it “should find the
defendant guilty as charged in the indictment.”120 This arguably mirrors
the instruction the Court rejected in Bailey that effectively required the
jury to find an intent to defraud if the prosecution proved nothing more
than a breach of contract or a failure to repay a debt,121 yet Hawes did
not offer much in the way of explaining how the instruction given to
Mr. Hawes’s jury did not have substantially the same effect as the
instruction given to the jury Mr. Bailey’s case.
111

Hawes, 258 U.S. at 2.
Hawes, 258 U.S. at 4, 5.
113
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
114
Bailey, 219 U.S. at 235-37.
115
Bailey, 219 U.S. at 235-37.
116
Hawes, 258 U.S. at 4 (citing Bailey, 219 U.S. 219).
117
Hawes, 258 U.S. at 4 (citing McFarland, 241 U.S. 79).
118
McFarland, 241 U.S. at 86.
119
Hawes, 258 U.S. at 2.
120
Hawes, 258 U.S. at 2.
121
Bailey, 219 U.S. at 230.
112
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The Hawes presumption is a “mandatory presumption” because
it required the jury to convict Mr. Hawes if the government proved the
discovery of the alcohol manufacturing equipment on his property and
he did not prove a lack of knowledge. 122 This put Mr. Hawes in a bind;
rebut the presumed fact or suffer a conviction. Statutes like the one in
Hawes affirmatively require the defendant to rebut the presumption—
or else.123 Arguably, the most effective way for a defendant to do this is
to take the stand in his own defense. This, however, implicates another
constitutional right, i.e., the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and the accompanying right to not have a jury draw an
adverse inference if a defendant does not testify. 124 Whether mandatory
presumptions violate the Fifth Amendment is an issue the Court
addressed in Yee Hem v. United States.125
A jury convicted Yee Hem for violating a federal law making it
illegal to knowingly conceal illegally imported smoking opium. 126 The
law authorized a conviction based on mere possession of smoking
opium unless the defendant explained why he had the opium in his
possession.127 Finally, the law said all smoking opium found in the
United States was presumed to have been imported illegally, and placed
the burden of proving otherwise on the accused.128 The Court found it
logical to infer “that opium found in the country more than fourteen
years129 after its importation had been prohibited was unlawfully
imported.”130 The Court said that for more than fifty years, using opium
for anything other than medical purposes was unlawful, and anyone
possessing opium for any purpose other than a medical one assumed
the risk that he would have to explain why he had it or risk being
convicted.131
The law in Yee Hem comes very close to “declaring an
individual presumptively guilty of a crime.” 132 The Court addressed
this by saying “the presumption of innocence can be overcome, even
when the facts alone are not enough, by the additional weight of a
122

Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16 (citation omitted); Hawes, 258 U.S. at 2.
Hawes, 258 U.S. at 2.
124
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965).
125
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
126
Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 181.
127
Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 182.
128
Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 182.
129
When law enforcement arrested Yee Hem in August 1923, he had a “quantity of
smoking opium” in his possession. Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 182.
130
Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 184.
131
Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 184.
132
McFarland, 241 U.S. at 86.
123
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countervailing legislative presumption.” 133 According to the Court, if
the presumption happens to give “artificial value” to the proven fact, it
is not unlike “a great variety of presumptions” that are commonplace in
the law and never considered problematic in the past.134 The Court said
the following with respect to Yee Hem’s Fifth Amendment argument:
The statute compels nothing. It does no more than to make
possession of the prohibited article prima facie evidence of
guilt. It leaves the accused entirely free to testify or not as he
chooses. If the accused happens to be the only repository of
the facts necessary to negative the presumption arising from
his possession, that is a misfortune [that] the statute under
135
review does not create but [that] is inherent in the case.

Legislatures seemed to be enacting presumptions to serve as
substitutes for actual evidence, particularly in cases where intent would
be difficult to prove.136 At this point in the Court’s development of its
presumption jurisprudence, however, no justice agreed with this point
of view. It took another “opium” case—this time with a lawyer as the
defendant—before a member of the Court would suggest that
presumptions were indeed being used as substitutes for evidence.
1.The Emergence of Justice Pierce Butler
A jury convicted criminal defense lawyer Thomas J. Casey for
sending towels soaked with a morphine solution to his incarcerated
clients.137 Congress made it a crime to “purchase or sell opium and its
derivatives except in or from the original stamped package.” 138 That
same law said the “absence of the required stamps from the drug shall
be prima facie evidence of a violation by the person found possessing
the drug.”139 A majority of the Court found that a rational connection
existed between the presumption that Mr. Casey sold opium without
the required stamps and the proven fact that he possessed the morphine

133

Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 184-85.
Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 185.
135
Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 185.
136
Bailey, 219 U.S. at 233, 235 (citing Bailey v. State, 158 Ala. 18, 25, 48 So. 498,
499 (1908)).
137
Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 416-17 (1928).
138
Casey, 276 U.S. at 417.
139
Casey, 276 U.S. at 417.
134
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soaked towels before sending them to his clients.140 Next, the Court
said something rather remarkable:
The statute here talks of prima facie evidence, but it means
only that the burden shall be upon the party found in
possession to explain and justify it when accused of the crime
that the statute creates.141 It is consistent with all the
constitutional protections of accused men to throw on them
the burden of proving facts peculiarly within their knowledge
142
and hidden from discovery by the Government.

The Casey majority held that it is perfectly consistent with the
Constitution to shift the burden of proof to the defendant in a criminal
case to disclose what only he knows, i.e., whether he actually intended
to commit the offense, rather than the prosecution bearing the burden of
proving his intent to commit the offense.143 What is striking about this
announcement of a rule of constitutional law is the fact that the
majority did not cite the Constitution itself or one of the Court’s prior
presumption cases to support it; instead, it cited John Henry Wigmore’s
treatise on evidence.144 Had this been a matter of first impression, Dean
Wigmore145 might have been the best source available; however, twice
in the preceding six years the Court issued decisions involving
mandatory presumptions strikingly similar to the one before it in
Casey.146 Casey went further than the Court’s prior presumption cases,
however, because it held that there is no constitutional bar to requiring
the defendant to prove he lacked the intent to commit an offense.147
Justice McReynolds dissented.148 He considered any rational
connection between possessing morphine and the presumption that the
possession was unlawful to be “imaginary.”149 He also said
presumptions exist to “lighten the burden of the prosecutor” and
140

Casey, 276 U.S. at 418.
Casey, 276 U.S. at 418 (citing 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 2494).
142
Casey, 276 U.S. at 418 (citing 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 2486).
143
Casey, 276 U.S. at 418 (citing 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 2486).
144
Casey, 276 U.S. at 418 (citing 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 2486).
145
John Henry Wigmore served as the dean of Northwestern University School of
Law from 1901 to 1929. http://www.law.northwestern.edu/news/history/ (last visited
Aug. 17, 2012).
146
Yee Hem, 268 U.S. 178; Hawes, 258 U.S. 1. Casey cited Yee Hem, but only for the
proposition that a rational connection had to exist between the fact proved and the
presumed fact in order for the statutory presumption to comply with the Constitution.
147
Casey, 276 U.S. at 418.
148
Casey, 276 U.S. at 420-21 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
149
Casey, 276 U.S. at 420 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
141
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compared the one in Casey to the discredited practice of coercing a
confession by using a thumbscrew; “The victim will be spared the
trouble of confessing and will go to his cell without mutilation or
disquieting outcry.”150 Justice Butler also dissented, saying the
government used the statutory presumption to make up for its lack of
proof on how Mr. Casey came to possess the morphine.151 He and
Justice McReynolds became the first members of the Court to express
skepticism at the idea of using presumptions not only to make it easier
to convict defendants, but to serve as evidence where it might
otherwise be lacking. A little more than ten months later, Justice
Butler’s view became the majority view in Manley v. Georgia.152
In Manley, the Court invalided a Georgia statute declaring that
all bank insolvencies resulted from fraud. 153 The presumption of fraud
could be overcome if a defendant showed that he managed the bank in
a “fair and legal” manner and with the “same care and diligence that
agents receiving a commission for their services are required and bound
by law to observe.”154 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Butler
stated “Mere legislative fiat may not take the place of fact in the
determination of issues involving, life, liberty[,] or property.” 155 One
could not reasonably infer that a bank president committed fraud
simply because the bank became insolvent, thus the Court found the
presumption to be “unreasonable and arbitrary.” 156 Manley started a
trend of invalidating statutory presumptions under the Turnipseed
formulation. 157

150

Casey, 276 U.S. at 420 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
Casey, 276 U.S. at 426 (Butler & McReynolds, JJ., dissenting).
152
Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929).
153
Manley, 279 U.S. at 3-4.
154
Manley, 279 U.S. at 3.
155
Manley, 279 U.S. at 6. Justice Butler said nearly the same thing in Ferry. Ferry,
277 U.S. at 97 (“But here the state by legislative fiat substituted such proof on its part
the prima facie presumption set forth.”).
156
Manley, 279 U.S. at 7.
157
Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89, 90-92 (1933) represented a departure from the
trend. Peter Rossi (“Mr. Rossi”) and Edward Ehrett (“Mr. Ehrett”) were convicted of
running a commercial distillery without giving the bond required by federal law.
Rossi, 289 U.S. at 89-90. At their bench trial, the government introduced evidence
that Messrs. Rossi and Ehrett operated a distillery and did not post the required bond.
Rossi, 289 U.S. at 89-90. Neither defendant testified, and the government argued
because they bore the burden of proving that they executed a bond and offered no
such proof, they should have been declared guilty. Rossi, 289 U.S. at 90-91. The
Supreme Court affirmed their convictions, finding that proof of persons operating
distilleries for an unlawful purpose gave rise to an inference that they operated them
without a bond, and they bore the burden of proving otherwise. Rossi, 289 U.S. at 91.
151
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By the time the Court decided Western and Atlantic Railroad v.
Henderson158 in 1929, the Turnipseed formulation had been in place for
more than eighteen years, and the Court used it in nine cases,159 yet for
some reason, in its next presumption case, Morrison v. California,160
the Court decided that a new formulation was in order. In Morrison, the
Court struck down a California statute that made it a crime for persons
ineligible for United States citizenship to possess real property.161 If the
government alleged that an ineligible person possessed real property,
that person bore the burden of proving his citizenship or eligibility for
citizenship.162 The law required this burden shift in both civil and
criminal cases.163 The Court found that no rational connection existed
between proof of a person alleged to be a non-citizen possessing
property and the presumption that if he did not rebut the allegation of
non-citizenship, he lacked eligibility for citizenship.164 That is not all
the Court did, however; it reformulated the test for a constitutionally
valid presumption. 165
The Court said legislatures can create presumptions and change
burdens of proof, but in order for a presumption to pass constitutional
muster, “What is proved must be so related to what is inferred in the
158

Western and Atlantic Railroad v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929). In Henderson,
the Court invalidated a railroad liability statute almost identical to the one it upheld in
Turnipseed. Henderson, 279 U.S. at 640-44.
159
Henderson, 279 U.S. at 640-42; Manley, 279 U.S. at 3-4; Ferry v. Ramsey, 277
U.S. 88, 93-97 (1928); Casey, 276 U.S. at 416-17; Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 181-85;
Hawes, 258 U.S. at 2-5; McFarland, 241 U.S. at 85-86; Luria, 231 U.S. at 19-22;
Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 81-83.
160
Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82.
161
Morrison, 291 U.S. at 84, 89. In an earlier iteration of this case, the Court rejected
a due process challenge to a section of the California law that said when the
government proved that a person ineligible for United States citizenship used or
occupied real property, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove his citizenship or
else he would be convicted. Morrison, 291 U.S. at 87, 88 (citing Morrison v.
California, 288 U.S. 591 (1933) (appeal dismissed for the want of a substantial federal
question)) (“Morrison I”). The Court said that once the State has proved the two
things the California law required it to prove, i.e., a person’s use or occupation of real
property and that person’s ineligibility for United States citizenship, shifting the
burden of proof to that person to rebut the proof of his ineligibility for citizenship did
not “impair his immunities under the Constitution.” Morrison, 291 U.S. at 89-90.
162
Morrison, 291 U.S. at 84. This section of the law differed from the section of the
law the Court upheld in Morrison I because it shifted the burden of proof based on the
government merely alleging the defendant could not become a citizen, whereas the
law in Morrison I shifted the burden after the State actually proved the defendant’s
ineligibility for citizenship. Morrison, 291 U.S. at 87-90.
163
Morrison, 291 U.S. at 84.
164
Morrison, 291 U.S. at 90-91.
165
Morrison, 291 U.S. at 90-91.
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case of a true presumption as to be at least a warning signal according
to the teachings of experience.”166 The Court said the following with
respect to shifting the burden of proof:
For a transfer of the burden, experience must teach that the
evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister
significance or, if this at times be lacking, there must be in
any event a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and
opportunity for knowledge, as, for instance, where a general
prohibition is applicable to everyone who is unable to bring
167
himself within the range of an exception.

Morrison created a second presumption formulation and Court
opined that in future cases, shifting the burden of proof to a defendant
might be warranted based on “strong considerations of convenience,”168
which the Court said would be the case if the normal burden of proof
proved too difficult for the prosecution to satisfy.169 A decade later,
however, in Tot v. United States, the Court effectively shelved the
Morrison “balance of convenience” test.170
2. Justice Hugo Black Picks Up Where Justice Pierce Butler
Left Off
Tot involved a challenge to the Federal Firearms Act, which
made it unlawful for persons convicted of a violent crime to possess a
firearm shipped or transported in interstate commerce.171 The law also
said that if such a person possessed a firearm, it is presumed he
obtained it in interstate commerce.172 The government proved that
Frank Tot had been convicted of a violent crime, but it did not prove
166

Morrison, 291 U.S. at 90.
Morrison, 291 U.S. at 90-91 (citing 1 Greenleaf, Evidence § 79). The Court gave
the following examples of how this rule could be applied in particular cases: (1) if a
defendant is found in possession of a game the law makes it illegal to possess, the
burden can be shifted to him to prove “his special qualifications”; (2) if a defendant is
prosecuted for bigamy and the government proves he entered into a second marriage
during the life of his first wife, the burden can be shifted to him to prove the
lawfulness of the second marriage; and (3) if a defendant is found operating an illegal
business or profession, he can be charged with proving he has a license to do so.
Morrison, 291 U.S. at 91 n.4.
168
Morrison, 291 U.S. at 94.
169
Morrison, 291 U.S. at 94.
170
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
171
Tot, 319 U.S. at 464; United States v. Tot, 42 F. Supp. 252, 254 (D.N.J. 1941).
172
Tot, 319 U.S. at 464.
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that he receive his firearm in interstate commerce. 173 The government
argued the presumption satisfied Turnipseed because a rational
connection existed between the proven fact that Mr. Tot had been
convicted of crimes of violence and had a firearm in his possession, and
the presumed fact that he received the gun in interstate commerce.174
The government also argued that the presumption satisfied Morrison
because proving that Mr. Tot actually obtained the weapon in interstate
commerce worked too much of an inconvenience on the government,
therefore, he should have been required to prove he did not obtain the
gun in interstate commerce.175
The Court said the Turnipseed and Morrison tests “are not
independent tests[,] but that the first [Turnipseed] is controlling and the
second [Morrison] but a corollary.”176 Applying Turnipseed, the Court
held that the presumption that Mr. Tot received a weapon in interstate
commerce simply because he had been convicted of crimes of violence
at the time he got the gun did not satisfy the test of rationality. 177 Next,
the Court rejected the argument that a presumption could be justified on
the ground that the defendant possessed knowledge of certain facts
known only by him. 178
Justice Black wrote a concurrence in which he agreed that
“mere possession of a pistol coupled with [a] conviction of a prior
crime is no evidence at all that the possessor acquired it in interstate
commerce.”179 He said this particular statutory presumption effectively
compelled the jury to convict Mr. Tot notwithstanding the absence of
proof that he actually received the gun in interstate commerce, which is
not something the Constitution allows.180 He also raised the prospect
that statutory presumptions that put defendants in the position of having
to testify in order to avoid a conviction violate the Fifth Amendment’s
prohibition on self-incrimination. 181 This would not be the last word
Justice Black would have on the Fifth Amendment implications of
statutory presumptions.182
Between 1958 and 1970, the Court would take up the issue of
statutory presumptions six more times, and in each case, Justice Black,
173

Tot, 319 U.S. at 464-65.
Tot, 319 U.S. at 467.
175
Tot, 319 U.S. at 467.
176
Tot, 319 U.S. at 467-70.
177
Tot, 319 U.S. at 468.
178
Tot, 319 U.S. at 469.
179
Tot, 319 U.S. at 472 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
180
Tot, 319 U.S. at 472 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
181
Tot, 319 U.S. at 472 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
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Fuller & Urich, supra note 16, at 420-34.
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sometimes alone and sometimes with Justice Douglas, took the position
that statutory criminal presumptions violated the Fifth Amendment
Self-Incrimination Clause, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,
and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.183 Despite his
impassioned persistence, Justice Black never convinced four other
justices to adopt his views on the infirmity of statutory presumptions. 184
a. Leary v. United States185
In 1969, the Court added a new wrinkle to its presumption
doctrine in a case involving Harvard University professor Timothy
Leary. 186 A jury convicted Mr. Leary for knowingly smuggling
marijuana into the United States187 The federal law that served as the
basis for the conviction said that unless the defendant explained
otherwise, possession of marijuana alone would be sufficient evidence
that the drug was illegally imported and that the possessor knew it was
illegally imported.188 Before answering whether the statutory
presumption violated the Due Process Clause, the Court had to decide
which “test” to use to make that determination.189 The Court said it had
articulated three tests in its prior decisions: (1) the “rational
connection” test;190 (2) the “legislature can criminalize the act giving
rise to the presumption” test;191 and (3) the “balance of convenience”
test.192 The Court then said Tot “singled out the [rational connection]
test as controlling and had been adhered to in [two subsequent

183

Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 425-34 (1970) (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 55-56 (1969) (Black, J., concurring);
United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 144 (1965) (Black, J., concurring); United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 74-88 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Harris v. United
States, 359 U.S. 19, 24 (1959) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Speiser, 357 U.S. at
529-32.
184
Turner, 396 U.S. at 425-34 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Leary, 395 U.S. 6,
55-56 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); Romano, 382 U.S. at 144 (Black, J.,
concurring); Gainey, 380 U.S. at 74-88 (Black, J., dissenting); Harris, 359 U.S. at 24
(Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
185
Leary, 395 U.S. 6.
186
Allen, 442 U.S. at 160 n.17.
187
Leary, 395 U.S. at 10-11.
188
Leary, 395 U.S. at 12 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 176a).
189
Leary, 395 U.S. at 33-36.
190
Leary, 395 U.S. at 32 n.56 (citing Henderson, 279 U.S. at 642; Yee Hem, 268 U.S.
at 183; McFarland, 241 U.S. at 86; Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43).
191
Leary, 395 U.S. at 32 n.56 (citing Ferry, 277 U.S. 88, 94-95).
192
Leary, 395 U.S. at 32 n.56 (citing Morrison, 291 U.S. at 91; Rossi, 289 U.S. at 9192; Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 185).
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cases.]” 193 The Court read Tot as “reduc[ing] to the status of a
‘corollary’ [the ‘balance of convenience’ test]” and rejecting outright
the notion that a presumption “should be sustained if Congress might
have legitimately made it a crime to commit the basic act from which
the presumption allowed an inference to be drawn.”194
At this point in Leary, one could reasonably conclude that the
Court settled on the “rational connection” test as the single standard by
which presumptions would be assessed, which is also what Tot
attempted to do.195 Leary recognized the need to bring some clarity to
its presumption jurisprudence, which is evidenced by its five page
exegesis of the Court’s presumption decisions dating back to
Turnipseed in 1910, but what it did next undermined that effort.196 The
Court said the “upshot” of Tot, Gainey, and Romano means
a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as
irrational or arbitrary, and hence unconstitutional, unless it
can at least be said with substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the
[proven] fact on which it is made to depend. And in the
judicial assessment[,] the congressional determination
favoring the particular presumption must, of course, weigh
197
heavily.

This represented yet another “new” formulation of the standard
to determine the validity of statutory presumptions in the criminal law.
The Court did not say if its “presumption more likely than not flowing
from the proven fact” framework added to the “rational connection”
test or replaced it. Moreover, the “more likely than not” assessment of
an element of an offense is not proper in a criminal case, which
requires proof of the essential elements of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.198 Notwithstanding these unanswered questions,
Leary settled on the “presumption more likely than not flowing from
the proven fact” standard and reversed Mr. Leary’s conviction.199
193

Leary, 395 U.S. at 34 (citing Tot, 319 U.S. at 467). The two subsequent cases are
Romano, 382 U.S. at 139 and Gainey, 380 U.S. at 66-67.
194
Leary, 395 U.S. at 34 (citing Tot, 319 U.S. at 469, 472).
195
Tot, 319 U.S. at 467-70.
196
Leary, 395 U.S. at 32-36.
197
Leary, 395 U.S. at 36.
198
The Court did not reach the issue of whether a statutory criminal presumption
would be unconstitutional if it more likely than not flowed from a proven fact but did
not do so beyond a reasonable doubt. Leary, 395 U.S. at 36 n.64.
199
Leary, 395 U.S. at 37-54. The Court said its assessment of the validity of the
“knowledge” presumption required it to determine whether it authorized a jury to
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Justice Black agreed that it violated the Constitution to presume
Mr. Leary knew the origin of the marijuana found in his possession
simply because he possessed it. 200 He did not, however, agree with the
reasoning the Court employed to reach that conclusion. 201 In Justice
Black’s view, the presumption violated the Fifth Amendment, Sixth
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment for the same reasons he
expressed in his Tot concurrence and his dissent in United States v.
Gainey.202 As he said more than once before, Congress does not have
the authority “to instruct the judge and jury in an American court what
evidence is enough for conviction.” 203 He also found the law
“irrational” and “arbitrary,” but made a point of saying he rejected the
“rational connection” test as too “nebulous” a standard for gauging
whether a statutory presumption violated the Due Process Clause.204
With this, Justice Black made clear what he hinted at in his Gainey
dissent, i.e., the “rational connection” test does not sufficiently respect
the values of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 205
Justice Black would have one more opportunity206 to convince
four of his colleagues to join his view that statutory presumptions
violate the right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and
the right to due process of law, and that opportunity would arrive eight
months later.207
b. Turner v. United States208
convict a defendant even if the government’s proof of his knowledge turned out to be
insufficient. Leary, 395 U.S. at 37. The Court found that Congress enacted this
presumption “to relieve the Government of the burden of having to adduce such
evidence at every trial,” which marked the second time the Court expressly found that
Congress enacted a presumption to take the place of actual proof in a criminal trial.
Leary, 395 U.S. at 38; Gainey, 380 U.S. at 65-66. Justices Butler and McReynolds
expressed this precise sentiment in their dissent in Casey, 276 U.S. at 426 (Butler &
McReynolds, JJ., dissenting).
200
Leary, 395 U.S. at 55-56 (Black, J., concurring).
201
Leary, 395 U.S. at 55-56 (Black, J., concurring); Romano, 382 U.S. at 144 (Black,
J., dissenting).
202
Leary, 395 U.S. at 55-56 (Black, J., concurring) (citing Gainey, 380 U.S. at 74-88
(Black, J., dissenting); Tot, 319 U.S. at 472 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring)).
203
Leary, 395 U.S. at 55 (Black, J., concurring).
204
Leary, 395 U.S. at 56 (Black, J., concurring).
205
Leary, 395 U.S. at 56 (Black, J., concurring) (citing Gainey, 380 U.S. at 74-88
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting)).
206
Justice Black resigned from the Court on September 17, 1971 and died eight days
later. Noah Feldman, Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR’s Great Supreme
Court Justices 424 (2010).
207
Turner, 396 U.S. 398.
208
Turner, 396 U.S. 398.
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A jury convicted James Turner for four drug offenses: (1)
concealing heroin while knowing the heroin was brought into the
United States illegally; (2) distributing heroin that was not in or from
the “original stamped package”; (3) concealing cocaine while knowing
the cocaine was brought into the United States illegally; and (4)
distributing cocaine that was not in or from the “original stamped
package.”209
The prosecution put the heroin and cocaine into evidence, but
did not present any proof that the drugs were brought into the country
illegally.210 The trial judge instructed the jury that because Mr. Turner
did not explain why he had heroin and cocaine in his possession, it
could infer he knew the drugs were brought into the country
illegally.211 The judge further instructed the jury that Mr. Turner’s
possession of the heroin and cocaine established prima facie evidence
that he “purchased, sold, dispensed, or distributed the drugs not in or
from [the] original stamped package.”212 The Supreme Court agreed to
hear Mr. Turner’s case to decide if his conviction should stand in light
of Leary.213
Turner described the standard for assessing the constitutional
validity of statutory presumptions as “requiring the invalidation of the
statutorily authorized inference ‘unless it can at least be said with
substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to
flow from the [proven] fact upon which it is made to depend.’”214
Turner got this from Leary, and Leary got it from a synthesis of Tot,
Gainey, and United States v. Romano.215 Leary left open the question of
whether the “presumed fact more likely than not flows from the proven
fact” formulation replaced Turnipseed’s “rational connection”
formulation. Turner did not answer this question either.
Applying Leary, the Court concluded that because it was illegal
to import or manufacture heroin in the United States, it was sound for
the jury to infer that if a person had heroin in his possession, he knew it
was illegally imported.216 The Court then invoked Turnipseed and said
that in the six decades since that decision, defendants were on notice
209

Turner, 396 U.S. at 400-02.
Turner, 396 U.S. at 402.
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Turner, 396 U.S. at 402.
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Turner, 396 U.S. at 402-03.
213
Turner, 396 U.S. at 403.
214
Turner, 396 U.S. at 404-05 n.4 (citing Romano, 382 U.S. 136; Gainey, 380 U.S.
63; Tot, 319 U.S. 463).
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Turner, 396 U.S. at 404-05; Leary, 395 U.S. at 36.
216
Turner, 396 U.S. at 406-08.
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that juries could infer guilt from heroin possession alone; that the
inference could be rebutted by proof that the heroin was domestic in
origin; and that if proof of heroin possession was not “sufficiently
connected” to the presumed fact that the possessor knew the heroin was
illegally imported, then the inference “itself” could be “[subjected] to
attack.”217 This marked the eighth time the Court used Turnipseed as a
baseline for assessing the constitutionality of a statutory presumption in
a criminal case.218 The Court said that the statutory inference that a
possessor of heroin knows the drug was illegally imported made simple
possession of heroin a criminal offense, and if a defendant in such a
case wanted to avoid a conviction, he needed to prove his heroin was
domestic heroin by either testifying himself or having someone
conversant with drug trafficking testify. 219
The Court had “no reasonable doubt” that in 1970, no one
produced heroin in the United States, therefore, it affirmed Mr.
Turner’s heroin convictions.220 It had a different view when it came to
cocaine. Domestic production of cocaine was “sufficiently large” that
under Leary, the presumption that one who possesses cocaine knows it
was illegally imported could not be sustained, and the Court reversed
Mr. Turner’s cocaine convictions.221 The Court used Leary to evaluate
the cocaine law, but used Leary and Turnipseed for the heroin law.222
The Court then overruled Casey v. United States223 to the extent it
could be read to authorize a conviction for purchasing, selling,
dispensing, or distributing cocaine “not in or from the original stamped
package” based on proof of possession alone.224
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented, and wrote
what would be his final judicial words on the issue of statutory
presumptions in the criminal law.225 The first sentence set the tone for
his entire dissent: “Few if any decisions of this Court have done more
217

Turner, 396 U.S. at 409 (citing Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43).
Romano, 382 U.S. at 139-40; Gainey, 380 U.S. at 67-71; Tot, 319 U.S. at 467-72
(1943); Casey, 276 U.S. at 418-20; Yee Hem, 268 U.S. at 183-85; Hawes, 258 U.S. at
4-5; Bailey, 219 U.S. at 238-45.
219
Turner, 396 U.S. at 409.
220
Turner, 396 U.S. at 408, 415-16 (“We have no reasonable doubt that at the present
time[,] heroin is not produced in this country[,] therefore[,] the heroin Turner had was
smuggled heroin…. Concededly, heroine could be made in this country, at least in
tiny amounts. But the overwhelming evidence is that the heroin consumed in the
United States is illegally imported. To possess heroin is to possess imported heroin.”).
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Turner, 396 U.S. at 418-19.
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Turner, 396 U.S. at 408-10, 417-19.
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Casey, 276 U.S. 413.
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Turner, 396 U.S. at 423-24.
225
Turner, 396 U.S. at 425-34 (Black & Douglas, JJ. dissenting).
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than this one today to undercut and destroy the due process safeguards
the [F]ederal Bill of Rights specifically provides to protect defendants
charged with crime in United States courts.”226 He would have reversed
each of Mr. Turner’s convictions because the government did not so
much as attempt to prove that the heroin or cocaine was actually
imported illegally or that Mr. Turner had actual knowledge that the
drugs were imported illegally. 227 This failure of proof violated the
principle that the government “must demonstrate to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt each essential element of the alleged offense.”228
He went on to say that statutory criminal presumptions would
astound the drafters of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights because
they did not intend to allow the government to “create crimes of several
separate and independent parts and then relieve [it] of proving a portion
of them.”229 He added that, “It would be a senseless and stupid thing for
the Constitution to provide [the safeguards found in the Bill of Rights]
to protect the accused from governmental abuses if the Government by
some sleight-of-hand trick with presumptions make[s] nullities of those
[protections.]”230 What caused Justice Black the most consternation
was that the jury did not explicitly find that Mr. Turner knew the heroin
and cocaine were illegally imported or that he actually got the
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Turner, 396 U.S. at 425. Justice Black then listed which constitutional rights he
thought the Court “weaken[ed]”: (1) the Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled
to answer for capital or infamous crimes except on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury; (2) the Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; (3) the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; (4) the Fifth
Amendment right to due process of law; (5) the Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses; (6) the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process; (7) the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel; and (8) the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.
Turner, 396 U.S. at 425. Using language strikingly familiar to what is commonly
heard in contemporary discussions of judicial decisions and the judges who make
them, Justice Black accused the justices in the majority of using an “activist
philosophy” that led them to “construe [the] Constitution as meaning what they now
think it should mean in the interest of ‘fairness and decency’ as they see it.” Turner,
396 U.S. at 426.
227
Turner, 396 U.S. at 428-29.
228
Turner, 396 U.S. at 427-29. He agreed with the majority that the convictions for
possessing illegally imported cocaine and possessing cocaine from an unstamped
package should be reversed. Turner, 396 U.S. at 429. He did not agree, however, with
the majority’s reasoning; he would have reversed based on the lack of evidence that
the cocaine was illegally imported and the lack of evidence that it came from an
unstamped package. Turner, 396 U.S. at 429.
229
Turner, 396 U.S. at 430-31.
230
Turner, 396 U.S. at 430.
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substances from an unstamped package.231 Instead, the jury just
inferred these two facts based on proof of possession alone.232
In a precursor to Apprendi v. New Jersey,233 Justice Black said
the Sixth Amendment grants defendants the right to have “the jury and
the jury alone” find the facts of a case, including whether each element
of the offense has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and
statutory presumptions violate this right. 234 Furthermore, legislatures,
while authorized to declare what a crime is, cannot “define and limit
the quantum of evidence necessary to convict.”235 Justice Black
concluded his dissent with an analysis of the Fifth Amendment
implications of statutory criminal presumptions.236 He took the view
that the presumptions unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to
defendants to prove their innocence.237 A defendant like Mr. Turner
either had to testify regarding what he knew or did not know, or risk
having the trial judge instruct the jury that the lack of an explanation
regarding his knowledge would be sufficient to convict him. 238 This
Hobson’s choice undermines a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and the accompanying right to not have a
jury draw an adverse inference from his election not to testify. 239
By the standards of the early 1970s, Turner is a long case,
covering thirty-seven pages in the United States Reports with fortyseven footnotes.240 Yet the Court did not use any of those pages or
footnotes to clarify whether Leary or Turnipseed would control when it
came to evaluating statutory criminal presumptions. Forty months later,
the Court would get that chance in a case about $876.52 in stolen
checks.241
3. The “Reasonable Doubt and More Likely Than Not
Standard”
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Turner, 396 U.S. at 432-33.
239
Turner, 396 U.S. at 432-33.
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On July 8, 1971, James Barnes deposited four checks totaling
$876.52 into an account he set up for the fictitious “Clarence Smith.”242
The checks did not belong to Mr. Barnes; he intercepted them in the
mail and forged the endorsements.243 The government charged him
with two counts of possession of stolen United States Treasury checks
with knowledge of their being stolen; forging stolen checks; and
“uttering” the checks with knowledge of the forged endorsements.244
The trial court instructed the jury that unless Mr. Barnes explained why
he had recently stolen property in his possession, it could infer that he
knew the checks were stolen.245 Mr. Barnes did not testify, and the jury
found him guilty on all charges.246 The Supreme Court agreed to hear
the case to decide whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury
violated due process.247
The Court began by reviewing its holdings in Turner, Leary,
Romano, and Gainey and concluded that “the teaching of the foregoing
cases is not altogether clear.”248 The Court drew this conclusion
because of the different formulations those cases used to assess the
validity of statutory criminal presumptions. 249 The language varied
from “rational connection,” to “more likely than not,” to “reasonable
doubt.”250 The Barnes Court explained that “the ambiguity” resulting
from these differing formulations owed itself to “variations in language
and focus rather than to differences in substance.”251 The Court then
recast these three tests into a new one: if the evidence necessary to
invoke a statutory inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the
inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt, or if the evidence is sufficient
for a rational juror to find the inferred fact as more likely than not, the
inference complies with due process.252
Had the Court limited the use of presumptions in criminal cases
to those instances where a reasonable juror could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the presumed fact flows from the proven one, the
argument against statutory presumptions in criminal cases would be
considerably weaker because at least the criminal law standard of proof
242
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would still be the guidepost. But that is not what the Court did. It went
one step further—and one step too far—and authorized the use of
presumptions in criminal cases as long as a reasonable juror could find
the presumed fact more likely than not flows from the proven one.
“More likely than not” is synonymous with “a preponderance of the
evidence,” which is the standard of proof in civil cases. 253 The civil
standard of proof should not be used when a jury is deciding whether
the prosecution has proved an essential element of a crime. If a jury is
going to presume the existence of an element of a crime based on proof
of a predicate fact, it should only be allowed to do so if it is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumed fact flows from the
proven one. Barnes did what Turnipseed did and imported a civil
burden of proof into a criminal case for the purpose of evaluating the
constitutionality of a presumption. 254
Using its newly announced framework, the Barnes Court
affirmed Mr. Barnes’s convictions, finding that because he did not
explain why he had recently stolen checks payable to other persons in
his possession, a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he
knew the checks were stolen. 255 The Court agreed that “the practical
effect” of instructing the jury to infer Mr. Barnes knew the checks were
stolen because he did not explain otherwise, shifted the “burden of
going forward with evidence to the defendant.”256 It held this is
permissible so long as a rational juror could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the inferred fact flows from the proven one. 257 In
doing so, however, the Court relied on language in Tot v. United States
that said the burden of going forward with evidence can be shifted to
the defendant when there is a rational connection between the proven
fact and the presumed fact.258 In Mr. Barnes’s case, the presumption
satisfied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, therefore it also
satisfied the lesser rational connection standard.259 There is, however, a
problem with the way the Court framed the issue: Tot did not say what
the Court says it did.260
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Tot rejected the notion of shifting the burden of going forward
with evidence to the defense based on a mere rational connection
between the presumed fact and the proven one. 261 Tot also rejected the
argument that a rational connection existed between the proven fact of
gun possession and the presumed fact of knowledge that the gun was
shipped or transported in interstate commerce.262 At bottom, Tot does
not support Barnes’s conclusion that it is permissible to shift the
burden of going forward with evidence to the defendant if there is a
rational connection between the presumed fact and the proven one.
Justice Douglas dissented, and took issue with presumptions
and inferences in criminal cases more broadly, describing their use as
“treacherous, for it allows men to go to jail without any evidence on
one essential ingredient of the offense.”263 He concluded his dissent by
echoing what Justice Hugo Black said eight years earlier United States
v. Gainey: “The step we take today will be applauded by prosecutors,
as it makes their way easy.… What we do today, is, I think, extremely
disrespectful of the constitutional regime that controls the dispensation
of criminal justice.”264
Barnes held that a statutory presumption “accords with due
process” so long as a rational juror could find that a presumed fact
flows from a proven predicate fact, and is convinced of that finding
beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence.265
Barnes also established that a presumption can be used to shift the
burden of going forward with evidence to the defendant if a rational
juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumed fact flows
from the proven fact, or if there is a rational connection between the
presumed fact and the proven fact.266 This burden shifting formulation
would be put to the test twenty-three months later in a murder case
from the State of Maine, Mullaney v. Wilbur.267
In 1966 the State of Maine charged Stillman E. Wilbur with
murder.268 Mr. Wilbur did not testify at his trial, but his lawyer offered
261
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two arguments: (1) he lacked the intent to kill, therefore, the killing was
not unlawful; and (2) the killing was manslaughter rather than murder
because it occurred in the heat of passion following a provocation by
the victim. 269 The trial court instructed the jury that “malice
aforethought is an essential and indisputable element of the crime of
murder, without which the homicide would be manslaughter.”270 The
court further instructed the jury unless Mr. Wilbur “proved by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation,” malice aforethought would be “conclusively”
imputed to him if the government proved that he killed the victim
intentionally and unlawfully.” 271 The jury convicted Mr. Wilbur of
murder.272 After having his conviction vacated in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to decide
whether Maine’s law requiring a defendant prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion in order to reduce
murder to manslaughter violated due process.273
The Court held that Maine’s law “affirmatively shifted the
burden of proof to the defendant.”274 Mullaney made it clear that if
intent is an element of an offense, the burden cannot be shifted to the
defendant to prove he lacked intent.275 In light of this holding, the
Court said that “[due process] requires the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden
provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide
case.”276 Two years later, the Court would limit this requirement in the
case of Patterson v. New York.277
The State of New York charged Gordon Patterson, Jr. with
second degree murder, which required the prosecution to prove he
intended to cause the death of another person and actually caused the
death of another person.278 State law allowed a murder defendant to
raise the affirmative defense that he “acted under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable
explanation or excuse,” but required the defendant to prove the
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affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.279 If the
defendant successfully asserted the defense, he would be guilty of
manslaughter instead of murder.280 The trial court instructed the jury
that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Patterson
intentionally killed the victim, but he also proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that he acted under the influence of an extreme
emotional disturbance, it must convict him of manslaughter instead of
murder.281 The jury convicted Mr. Patterson of murder.282 He petitioned
the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction in light of Mullaney’s
holding that due process forbade shifting the burden to the defendant to
prove the absence of malicious intent.283
The Court distinguished Mullaney and affirmed Mr. Patterson’s
conviction. 284 The Court reasoned that Mullaney prohibited shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant to negate an element of an offense; an
affirmative defense is not an element of an offense; therefore, there is
no constitutional bar to requiring a defendant asserting an affirmative
defense to prove the facts establishing that defense.285 Patterson
reaffirmed the principle that due process requires that the prosecution
prove all elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, but in so
doing, declined to require the government to “disprove beyond a
reasonable doubt” those facts “constituting any and all affirmative
defenses related to the culpability of an accused.”286 The Court did,
however, caution legislatures that they could not simply recast elements
of offenses as affirmative defenses in order relieve prosecutors of their
burdens of proof.287
4. Allen, Sandstrom, and Francis Establish the Current Doctrine
Between 1979 and 1985, the Court decided three cases that
established its current criminal presumption doctrine.288 Although the
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Court tried to bring some much needed clarity to exactly how statutory
presumptions are to be evaluated in criminal cases, it did not do so, and
arguably made things even more confusing than they were before it
undertook the project.
a. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen289
On March 28, 1973, two New York state troopers stopped a
vehicle for speeding on the New York Thruway. 290 When one of the
troopers approached the vehicle he saw two firearms through the
window of the car.291 After prying open the trunk, the officers found a
machine gun and heroin. 292 The State charged the four vehicle
occupants with illegal possession of firearms. 293 The statute forming
the basis of the charge said “the presence of a firearm in an automobile
is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons [in the]
vehicle.”294 The trial court instructed the jury that it could “infer
possession from the defendants’ presence in the car.”295 The jury
convicted all four for illegal possession of the handguns. 296
The facts of Allen are very similar to those of Tot v. United
States and the case should have been resolved with a straight-forward
application of Tot. Instead, the Court embarked on yet another
reformulation of its presumption jurisprudence, and rather than making
it simpler, it made it more confusing.297 The Court started by saying the
validity of “inferences and presumptions … vary from case to case …
depending on the strength of the connection between the particular
basis and elemental facts involved and on the degree to which the
device curtails the factfinder’s freedom to assess the evidence
independently.”298 This represented the Court’s synthesis of Barnes v.
United States, Tot v. United States, and Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City
R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed. This, however, is very different from Barnes’s
holding that a criminal presumption accords with the Constitution so
long as a rational juror could find that the presumed fact flows from the
289
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proven fact and can make that finding by a preponderance of the
evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt.299 It sounds more like
Turnipseed’s holding that a presumption is valid if the presumed fact is
rationally connected to the proven fact.300 Next, the Court said that
notwithstanding what the framework had been for assessing the validity
of presumptions, “the ultimate test of any device’s constitutional
validity in a given case remains constant: the device must not
undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence
adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable
doubt.”301
Then the Court described the various types of presumptions and
their effect on a defendant’s rights. 302 Permissive presumptions allow,
but do not require, the fact finder to presume a fact based on proof of a
predicate fact, and place neither the burden of production nor the
burden of persuasion on the defendant.303 With permissive
presumptions, the presumed fact can be considered prima facie
evidence of the predicate fact.304 These presumptions allow juries to
accept or reject the presumed fact and “affect the application of the
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard only if … there is no rational way
the jury could make the connection permitted by the inference.”305 This
suggests that if there is a “rational connection” between the presumed
fact and the predicate fact, the presumption is valid. If this is true, it is
nothing more than a reprise of Turnipseed, which would allow a jury in
a criminal case to determine by a preponderance of the evidence if an
element of an offense has been proved.
The Court then turned to mandatory presumptions, which it
described as “a far more troublesome evidentiary device.”306 These
presumptions “affect not only the strength of the ‘no reasonable doubt’
burden[,] but also the placement of that burden.” 307 They require that
juries find the presumed fact if the predicate fact is proved, unless the
defendant presents evidence to “rebut the presumed connection
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between the two facts.”308 The Court then divided mandatory
presumptions into two types: (1) those that shift the burden of
production to the defendant; and (2) those that shift the burden of proof
to the defendant.309
Turning back to the facts in Allen, the Court considered the
presumption that the presence of a firearm in a vehicle is presumptive
evidence of its illegal possession by any occupant of the vehicle a
permissive presumption. 310 Because it was permissive, the jury could
reject it even if the defendants did not introduce evidence to rebut it.311
Moreover, the trial court instructed the jurors that a mandatory
presumption of the defendants’ innocence controlled unless they were
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants possessed the
handguns “in the manner described.”312 Last, the trial court instructed
the jury to consider all the facts, including those that supported or
contradicted the presumption that the defendants possessed the
firearms, and to decide the case without regard to how much evidence
the defendants introduced.313
Based on the foregoing, the Court held that the presumption
was “entirely rational.”314 The Court said the case was essentially one
in which firearms were lying on the floor or the seat of a vehicle in
“plain view” of its occupants, therefore, it was “surely rational” to infer
that all of them had knowledge of the guns along with the ability and
intent to “exercise dominion and control over the weapons.” 315 The
presumption satisfied the standards announced in Tot and Leary
because there was a “rational connection” between the presumed fact
that the guns were possessed illegally and the proven fact that the
possessors were in a vehicle with the guns, and the presumed fact
“more likely than not” flowed from the proven one.316
The vehicle occupants argued that the presumption had to
satisfy the more rigorous “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard rather
than the “more likely than not standard” and the Court responded by
saying permissive presumptions and mandatory presumptions should
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be evaluated differently. 317 A permissive presumption is valid “as long
as it is clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for
a finding of guilt.”318 The prosecution can rely on a permissive
presumption as part of its proof, but if it constitutes the entire proof, it
will not pass constitutional muster.319 If the remaining evidence in the
case satisfies the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the presumption
need only satisfy the standard announced in Leary that the presumed
fact must “more likely than not” flow from the proven fact. 320 On the
other hand, if the presumption is mandatory, which means the jury must
accept it even if the presumption is the only evidence the prosecution
relies on, it has to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
announced in Barnes.321 The prosecution can rely solely on a
mandatory presumption as long as a rational juror could find that the
presumed fact flows from the proven fact beyond a reasonable doubt.322
When a court has to decide whether a presumption is permissive
or mandatory, “the jury instructions will generally control.”323 If a jury
is explicitly instructed that a presumption is permissive or it is told to
consider the presumption as “‘a circumstance to be considered along
with all the other circumstances in the case,’” it is permissive.324 On the
other hand, if a jury is instructed that a presumption is or shall be
sufficient to authorize a conviction, it is mandatory.325
Allen established that the standard a presumption has to satisfy
depends on whether it is permissive or mandatory, and it did so without
overruling any of the Court’s prior presumption cases. 326 It implicitly
acknowledged, however, what Barnes explicitly stated: “the teaching
[of the Court’s prior presumption] cases is not altogether clear.”327
Barnes actually held that a presumption is valid if it satisfies the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard or the more likely than not
standard.328 Leary held that a statutory presumption is “unconstitutional
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unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the [proven] fact
upon which it is made to depend.”329 One could read both cases as
authorizing the use of a presumption, be it permissive or mandatory, if
it satisfies the more likely than not standard. Allen squared both
holdings (or at least attempted to) by announcing a novel rule that
permissive presumptions have to satisfy the more likely than not
standard while mandatory presumptions have to satisfy the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard.330
Justice Powell dissented and said that he had not “found [any]
recognition in the Court’s prior decisions that [the] distinction [between
permissive and mandatory presumptions] is important in analyzing
presumptions used in criminal cases.”331 He was correct; Allen marked
the first case in which the Court said that such a distinction is critical to
the constitutional analysis. He took the position that a presumption is
constitutional as long as it more likely than not flows from a proven
predicate fact.332 He did not think, however, that the presumption in
Allen passed this test because he did not agree that it was more likely
than not that one who occupies a vehicle in which there is a handgun
possesses the handgun illegally. 333 Fourteen days after announcing its
new presumption framework, the Court put it to the test in the second
of the three cases that constitute the Court’s current presumption
doctrine.334
b. Sandstrom v. Montana335
On July 18, 1977, the State of Montana tried David Sandstrom
for “deliberate homicide” for “purposely or knowingly” causing the
death of another person.336 Mr. Sandstrom’s lawyer argued to the jury
that he [Mr. Sandstrom] did not kill the victim “purposely or
knowingly” because at the time of the killing he suffered from a
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“personality disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption.” 337 The
prosecution requested that the jury be instructed to “[presume] that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.”338 Mr.
Sandstrom objected, arguing that the requested instruction violated due
process because it impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him on
the issue of “purpose or knowledge.” 339 He offered the trial judge a
number of federal judicial decisions to support his objection, including
Mullaney v. Wilbur, but the judge responded, “You can give those to
the Supreme Court. The objection is overruled.” 340 The jury convicted
Mr. Sandstrom of deliberate homicide. 341 The Supreme Court agreed to
hear the case to decide the question of “whether, in a case in which
intent is an element of the crime charged, the jury instruction, ‘the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts,’ violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that
the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.”342
In answering this question, the Court began by stating that the
first question when evaluating the constitutionality of a statutory
criminal presumption is what type of presumption it is, which in turn
requires an analysis of the jury instructions.343 The trial judge instructed
Mr. Sandstrom’s jury that “the law presumes that a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts” without any other
qualifier, and because of this, the Court considered this a mandatory
presumption that impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Mr.
Sandstrom to disprove his intent.344 If a defendant’s state of mind or
intent is an element of an offense, proof of that element “cannot be
taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a presumption of
wrongful intent.”345 Because the instruction shifted the burden of proof
to Mr. Sandstrom, it violated due process, and the Court reversed his
conviction. 346
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The combination of Allen and Sandstrom seemed to provide an
understandable and workable framework for evaluating relatively
straight-forward statutory criminal presumptions. But what if a jury is
instructed that a presumption is mandatory, but the defendant may rebut
it? Is this a permissive or mandatory presumption? Does it shift the
burden to the defendant? The Court answered these questions in the
third case that constitutes its current presumption doctrine.347
c. Francis v. Franklin348
On January 17, 1979, Raymond Lee Franklin temporarily
escaped from the Cobb County, Georgia jail. 349 At the time, he was at a
local dentist’s office receiving dental care, and while momentarily free
of handcuffs, he took a gun from a guard, took the keys to the dentist’s
car, and took the dentist’s assistant as his hostage.350 He drove for a
while and stopped at the home of Claude Collie.351 Mr. Franklin
“pounded” on Mr. Collie’s “heavy wooden front door,” and Mr. Collie
answered.352 When Mr. Collie saw Mr. Franklin pointing a gun at him,
he slammed the door, the gun went off, and the bullet went through the
door and fatally struck Mr. Collie in the chest.353 Mr. Franklin fled the
scene and was captured a short time later.354 After being captured, he
admitted he shot Mr. Collie, but insisted he did so as an accidental
response to the slamming of the door.355
The State of Georgia charged Mr. Franklin with “malice
murder” and kidnaping.356 During his trial, Mr. Franklin introduced
“substantial circumstantial evidence” that he shot Mr. Collie
accidentally. 357 The trial court instructed the jury that Mr. Franklin
could not be found guilty of a crime committed by accident, but “the
acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the
product of a person’s will, but the presumption may be rebutted.”358
The court further instructed the jury that “a person of sound mind and
347
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discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences
of his acts, but the presumption may be rebutted.”359 The trial court’s
final instruction said, “A person will not be presumed to act with
criminal intention[,] but … the jury may find criminal intention upon a
consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive[,] and all other
circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is
prosecuted.”360 The jury convicted Mr. Franklin and sentenced him to
death.361 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to answer whether
the jury instructions violated the due process and the principles
announced in Sandstrom.362
The Court framed the question before it as “almost identical” to
the question it answered in Sandstrom, i.e., “whether the challenged
[instructions effectively relieved] the State of the burden of [proving
Mr. Franklin’s] state of mind by creating a mandatory presumption of
intent upon proof by the State of other elements of the offense.”363 The
Court answered this question by following the rule laid down in Allen,
which required it to first determine whether the presumption was
permissive or mandatory. 364 The Court followed Allen’s formula in
defining a mandatory presumption as one requiring a jury to accept the
presumed fact if the prosecution proves a predicate fact, but then the
Court deviated from Allen by subdividing mandatory presumptions into
those that are conclusive and those that are rebuttable. 365 Allen also
subdivided mandatory presumptions, but not into conclusive and
rebuttable categories; rather, it divided mandatory presumptions into
those that shift the burden of production to the defendant and those that
shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant.366 Allen did not say
anything about conclusive mandatory presumptions or rebuttable
mandatory presumptions. Allen notwithstanding, Francis defined a
conclusive mandatory presumption as one that removes a presumed
element from a case once the government has proved the predicate
fact.367 The Court defined a rebuttable mandatory presumption as one
that does not remove the presumed element from the case, but
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nevertheless requires a jury to find the presumed element if the
defendant does not rebut the presumed element.368
Next, the Court defined a permissive presumption as one that
allows, but does not require, a jury to find the presumed fact if the
prosecution proves the predicate fact.369 This definition is consistent
with Allen.370 Francis remained consistent with Allen when it held that
mandatory presumptions violate due process if they relieve the
government of its burden of persuasion on any element of a criminal
offense. 371 What the Court did next, however, is depart from Allen a
second time. 372 Francis held that permissive inferences violate due
process if the presumed fact “is not one that reason and common sense
justify in light of the proven facts before the jury,” and cited Allen as
support for that proposition.373 Allen said no such thing. What Allen did
say is that a permissive presumption is valid if there is a “rational” way
for a jury to connect the presumed fact and the proven predicate fact.374
Allen did not say anything about a permissive presumption’s validity
being a function of “reason and common sense in light of the proven
facts before the jury.” The only language about “common sense” or
“common experience” in Allen is in Justice Powell’s dissent.375 In
further redefining mandatory presumptions and recasting the method
for determining the validity of permissive presumptions, Francis added
two more layers of complexity to the framework announced in Allen
and applied in Sandstrom.376 The Court then turned to analyzing
whether the jury instructions used in Mr. Francis’s trial were
permissive or mandatory.377 The Court followed Allen and looked to
the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the presumptions
were permissive or mandatory. 378 If a jury instruction “considered in
isolation” could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that a presumption
places the burden of persuasion on an element of an offense on the
368
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defendant, that instruction is impermissible. 379 If, however, other
instructions “might explain the particular infirm language” in a way
that a reasonable juror could not conclude that the presumption shifted
the burden of persuasion to the defendant, the instructions taken as a
whole would save the individually problematic instruction.380
The Court held that the instructions given to Mr. Francis’s jury
constituted a requirement that it presume he intended to kill Mr. Collie
once the State proved that Mr. Collie died from Mr. Francis’s
gunshot.381 In this respect, the Court considered these instructions no
different from the instructions it invalidated in Sandstrom.382 The State
tried to distinguish Mr. Francis’s instructions from those given in
Sandstrom on the ground that the trial judge in Mr. Francis’s case
explicitly told the jury that the presumption of intent could be
rebutted.383 The Court rejected this argument, holding that although a
mandatory presumption “does not remove the presumed element from
the case if the State proves the predicate facts, it nonetheless relieves
the State of the affirmative burden of persuasion on the presumed
element by instructing the jury that it must find the presumed element
unless the defendant [rebuts the presumed element].”384 This constitutes
an impermissible shifting of the burden of persuasion to the defendant
to disprove an element of an offense. 385 The Court held that a
reasonable juror in Mr. Francis’s case would have understood the
instructions as creating a requirement that he find that Mr. Francis
intended to kill Mr. Collie once the State proved that Mr. Francis shot
Mr. Collie. 386 Because the instructions as a whole shifted the burden of
persuasion to Mr. Francis on the element of intent, they violated his due
process rights, which required that his conviction be reversed.387
What does Allen, Sandstrom, and Francis instruct a reviewing
court to do when it is asked to decide if a presumption violates the
Constitution? First, the court has to determine whether the presumption
is permissive or mandatory, and then decide if it accords with due
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process.388 A permissive presumption allows, but does not require, a
jury to find a presumed fact if the prosecution proves a predicate
fact.389 A permissive presumption accords with due process under two
circumstances: (1) if there is a rational connection between the
presumed fact and the proven fact, and if the presumption does not
constitute the prosecution’s sole proof of an element of an offense;390 or
(2) the presumed fact is one that reason and common sense justify in
light of the proven facts before a jury. 391 In order to determine if a
rational connection exists between the presumed and predicate facts or
if reason and common sense justify the presumption, a court has to
review the evidence as a whole to see if it satisfies the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard without the use of the presumption.392 If it
does, the presumption accords with due process, otherwise, it does
not.393
A mandatory presumption requires a jury to accept the
presumed fact if the prosecution proves a predicate fact.394 There are
two (or perhaps four) types of mandatory presumptions: (1) conclusive
mandatory presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant on an element of an offense;395 and (2) rebuttable mandatory
presumptions that shift the burden of production to the defendant on an
element of an offense.396 A conclusive mandatory presumption says the
presumed element is established by the prosecution proving the
predicate element.397 A rebuttable mandatory presumption does not
establish the presumed element if the prosecution proves a predicate
element, but it nonetheless requires a jury to find the presumed element
if the defendant does not rebut the presumed element.398 A mandatory
presumption, be it conclusive or rebuttable, violates due process if it
relieves the government of its burden of persuasion on any element of
an offense.399
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To determine whether the burden of persuasion is shifted, a
court has to examine the jury instructions as a whole. 400 If a specific
instruction could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the defendant
has the burden of persuasion on an element of an offense, that
instruction violates due process unless other instructions explain the
“infirm” language in such a way that a reasonable juror could not
conclude that the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on an
element of an offense. 401 An instruction that “merely contradicts and
does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction” will leave a
reviewing court with no way to determine whether the defendant was
convicted because of the infirm instruction, therefore, such a conviction
must be vacated because there is a reasonable possibility that the jury
relied on the unconstitutional instruction in reaching its verdict.402
The foregoing constitutes the Court’s current framework for
evaluating the constitutionality of statutory presumptions in the
criminal law. From Fong Yue Ting v. United States403 in 1893 to
Francis v. Franklin404 in 1985, the Court’s presumption doctrine went
through quite a metamorphosis. In 1893 and 1896, the Court treated
criminal presumptions as rules of evidence that say once the
prosecution produces prima facie evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the
jury can conclude he is guilty unless he puts on evidence to negate the
prosecution’s prima facie evidence.405 In 1910, the Court held that a
presumption is valid if a rational connection exists between the
presumed fact and the proven predicate fact.406 In 1928, the Court
introduced a third method of evaluating statutory criminal
presumptions that said a presumption is valid if a legislature has the
authority to criminalize the act that gives rise to the presumption.407
The Court used this test in only one case, however.408
In 1934, the Court announced a fourth test, the “balance of
convenience” test, which says a presumption is valid if “the normal
burden of proof will so thwart or hamper justice as to create a practical
necessity, without preponderating hardship to the defendant, for a
departure from the usual rule.”409 In other words, if it is too difficult for
400
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the government to prove an element of an offense, the burden of proof
can be shifted to the defendant to disprove the element if the hardship
on the defendant caused by the burden shift does not outweigh the
inconvenience to the government of having to satisfy the “normal
burden of proof.” The “balance of convenience” test got put to rest in
1943 when the Court held that it was a “corollary” to the “rational
connection” test.410 In 1969, a fifth test emerged that said a
presumption passes constitutional muster if the presumed fact “more
likely than not” flows from the proven fact.411
In 1971, the Court combined the “rational connection” and
“more likely than not” tests into what became its sixth formulation,
which said a presumption is valid if a rational juror could find the
inferred fact from the proven fact beyond a reasonable doubt, or if a
rational juror could find the presumed fact more likely than not flows
from a proven fact.412 In 1975, the Court said this test requires that the
burden of proving an element of an offense always rests with the
government, and it has to prove each element beyond a reasonable
doubt.413 In 1977, however, the Court held that the burden of proving
the facts constituting an affirmative defense rests with the defendant,
and this marked the last decision the Court would issue on this subject
before Allen, Sandstrom, and Francis.414
How would the Allen, Sandstrom, and Francis formulation fare
today in the face of a constitutional challenge? The next part of this
Article analyzes that question.

II. PRESUMPTIONS VIOLATE DUE PROCESS, THE RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL, AND THE PROHIBITION AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker
Between 2000 and 2005, the Court decided three blockbuster
Sixth Amendment cases: Apprendi v. New Jersey;415 Blakely v.
Washington;416 and United States v. Booker.417 In Apprendi, the
defendant raised a due process challenge to a New Jersey statute that
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authorized his trial judge to enhance his sentence based on the judge’s
finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he “acted with a
purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of
race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity.”418 The Court framed the question presented as one involving
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have the jury make the
findings necessary to trigger the sentence enhancement and make those
findings beyond a reasonable doubt.419
The Court said its answer to the question presented “was
foreshadowed” in Jones v. United States, which held that under the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the “notice and jury trial
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact other than a prior
conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and [proved] beyond a
reasonable doubt.”420 Apprendi adopted the reasoning in Jones,
including the statements in Jones’s concurring opinions that “it is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts
must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”421 The statute
in Apprendi required a finding that the defendant was motivated by a
proscribed bias, and making such a finding is a classic function of a
jury, not a judge. 422 Because the statute invaded the jury’s function in
determining a defendant’s intent, the Court invalidated the law and
reversed the defendant’s conviction. 423 Almost four years after deciding
Apprendi, the Court faced a similar issue in Blakely v. Washington.424
In 1981, the legislature of the State of Washington enacted the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, which mandated that a trial court
impose a sentence within a standard range for an offense unless the
court found “substantial and compelling reasons” to deviate from the
418
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standard range. 425 Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr. pleaded guilty to
abducting his estranged wife, which subjected him to a sentencing
range of forty-nine to fifty-three months under the Act.426 After the trial
judge heard Mr. Blakely’s wife describe the details of the abduction, he
made a finding that Mr. Blakely acted with “deliberate cruelty,” which
authorized the court to enhance the maximum sentence by thirty-seven
months.427 The trial judge then sentenced Mr. Blakely to ninety months
in prison. 428 Mr. Blakely appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court,
arguing that the trial court making the findings necessary to justify a
sentence enhancement violated his Sixth Amendment right have a jury
make those findings beyond a reasonable doubt.429
The Court began by stating that the rule announced in
Apprendi—that any fact other than a prior conviction that increases a
sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt—reflected two “longstanding
tenets of common law criminal jurisprudence: (1) the ‘truth of every
accusation’ against a defendant ‘should afterwards by confirmed by the
unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours (sic)’”; and
(2) “‘an accusation [that] lacks any particular fact [that] the law makes
essential to the punishment … is no accusation within the requirements
of the common law, and it is no accusation in reason.’”430 The Court
defined “the statutory maximum” as “the maximum sentence a judge
could impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict
or admitted by the defendant.”431
Under this rule, if a judge enhances a sentence after making
findings in addition to those made by the jury, he violates the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have a jury find all facts that the
law “makes essential to punishment.”432 Because Mr. Blakely’s judge
425
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enhanced his sentence by thirty-seven months based on a finding not
made by a jury and not admitted to by Mr. Blakely, the Court
invalidated Mr. Blakely’s sentence.433
Justice O’Connor dissented in Apprendi and Blakely, and in
both cases she lamented and predicted that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission
in 1984, had to be unconstitutional because they too authorized judges
to increase sentences based on their own findings rather than a
jury’s.434 She turned out to be quite the soothsayer because six months
later, the Court invalided the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in United
States v. Booker.435
Booker combined two cases, both of which involved a United
States district judge using the discretion authorized by the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to increase a sentence above what it would have
been based on a jury’s findings alone.436 The Court held that the
Federal Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they
authorized an increase in a defendant’s sentence based on judicial
findings of fact by a preponderance of the evidence rather than jury
findings beyond a reasonable doubt.437 Recognizing that its ruling
would invalidate more than two decades’ worth of legislative
sentencing reforms, the Court said “in some cases jury factfinding may
impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants. But
the interest in fairness and reliability protected by the right to a jury
trial—a common law right that defendants enjoyed for centuries and
that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment—has always
outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.”438
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker are all premised on the notion
that a jury has a historic and exclusive role in criminal trials; to
determine whether the government has proved each element of an
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offense beyond a reasonable doubt.439 It is the jury and the jury alone
that has the authority to determine any fact necessary to convict a
defendant and any fact necessary to increase his punishment above a
statutory maximum. 440 The Sixth Amendment does not permit a
legislature to encroach on this prerogative. 441 I will now turn to
demonstrating how statutory presumptions in criminal cases do just
what the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments forbid.
B. Presumptions Lower the Prosecution’s Burden of Proof
In 1970, the Supreme Court “constitutionalized” the
requirement that the government prove each element of a criminal
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.442 What it did, however, was not
revolutionary; it merely made explicit what had been implicit since
1798.443 The constitutional basis for this principle is the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.444 The presumption
formulation developed in Allen, Sandstrom, and Francis does not
comport with this principle.
In Allen, the convicted defendants argued that the validity of a
presumption in a criminal case should be “judged by a ‘reasonable
doubt’ test rather than the ‘more likely than not’ standard.”445 The
Supreme Court rejected their argument on the ground that a permissive
presumption should not be subjected to a greater degree of judicial
scrutiny than a mandatory presumption. 446 The Court ratified this rule
in Francis v. Franklin.447
Allen and Francis conflict with Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker,
particularly when the presumption applies to an element of an offense.
The latter three cases are quite clear in their command that the elements
of an offense have to be presented to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.448 Allen and Francis exempted permissive
presumptions from this requirement on the thin reed that a jury is not
439
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required to accept the presumed fact if the government proves the
predicate fact.449 This is constitutionally problematic nevertheless
because although a jury is not required to find the presumed fact, it can
find the presumed fact and once it does, it can use that finding to
convict a defendant. Because Allen and Francis authorize a jury to find
an element of an offense under a lesser standard than beyond a
reasonable doubt, those cases conflict with Apprendi, Blakely, and
Booker.
Mandatory presumptions fare no better even though they have
to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.450 Conclusive
mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional because they shift the
burden of persuasion to the defendant.451 The party bearing the burden
of persuasion on an issue bears the ultimate burden of proof on that
issue, and placing that burden on a defendant is impermissible. 452 Take
the drug possession statute described in the Introduction of this Article.
That law would impute the intent to distribute to any person found with
one gram of marijuana. Under a conclusive mandatory presumption,
once the government proves possession, the jury would be required to
find intent, and hence convict the defendant. Six decades ago, the
Supreme Court said that if a defendant’s intent or state of mind is an
element of a criminal offense, that issue “cannot be taken from the trier
of fact through reliance on a legal presumption.”453 Conclusive
mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional because they shift the
burden of persuasion on an element of an offense to a defendant, which
relieves the government from having to prove that element.
Legislatures attempted to cure the defects in conclusive
mandatory presumptions by enacting rebuttable mandatory
presumptions.454 By making the presumption rebuttable, these statutes
ostensibly shift only the burden production to the defendant rather than
the burden of persuasion.455 These types of presumptions require a jury
to find a presumed fact if the government proves a predicate fact and
the defendant does not rebut the presumed fact.456 Making the
449
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presumption rebuttable does not cure the constitutional defect because
the presumption—rebuttable or not—serves as a substitute for actual
proof. All the government has to do is prove the predicate fact, and the
jury has to accept the presumed fact as “proven” if the defendant does
not rebut the presumed fact. When a presumption is used as a proxy for
actual proof of an element of an offense, the government is exempted
from having to actually prove that element, and that violates due
process. Moreover, requiring the defendant to rebut a presumption if
proof of a predicate fact is established undermines the defendant’s right
to rely “solely on the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden
of proof.”457
C. Presumptions Usurp the Jury’s Fact-finding Role
The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant have certain facts
determined by a jury and a jury alone.458 Determining the existence of a
fact presumes actual proof of that fact will be presented to a jury for it
to accept or reject. Examples of such facts include those essential to a
finding of guilt, those subjecting a defendant to the death penalty, those
allowing a sentence to be enhanced beyond a statutory or guideline
range, and those pertaining to a sentence in the upper range of a
determinate sentencing system. 459 Allowing facts constituting elements
of an offense to be established through the device of presumptions
allows legislatures to declare a person guilty or presumptively guilty of
an offense. 460 When a statutory presumption allows a jury to be
instructed that it may or must find certain facts because the government
has proved some other facts or because a defendant did not rebut the
facts the jury may or must find, the legislature has encroached on the
jury’s exclusive domain. 461
Instructing a jury that it can or may find a given fact on
anything less than proof of that actual fact is a trespass on the jury’s
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historic and exclusive role as the finder of fact. A presumption tells the
jury to assume the existence or proof of a fact that has not been actually
proved. While legislatures can establish what constitutes a crime, the
Constitution establishes the “quantum of evidence necessary to
convict,” and establishes the jury, not legislatures, as the entity
responsible for deciding if a defendant should be convicted.462
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker put a halt on legislatures’ twenty
year incursion into the jury’s territory. 463 The logic of those cases
likewise extends to statutory presumptions.464
D. Presumptions Infringe on a Defendant’s Fifth Amendment Rights
The Supreme Court has been dismissive if not hostile to the
argument that presumptions violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment
right against compulsory testimony or his right not to have a jury draw
an adverse inference from his not testifying. 465 The way the Court sees
it, the burden of rebutting a presumption does not require that a
defendant actually testify; he may have to put on a defense, but he can
do that without giving any testimony himself. 466 This is literally true,
but it ignores the reality of how criminal trials actually work,
particularly where a defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of
an offense.
Imputing a particular state of mind or intent to a defendant
based on proof of other facts requires the defendant to prove a negative,
i.e., he did not have a particular intent or state of mind at the time of the
alleged offense. It is difficult to see how the testimony of other defense
witnesses or the introduction of other types of evidence can effectively
rebut a presumption that the defendant knew something or intended a
certain result. The best the testimony of another witness can do is
indicate what that witness might have known or intended had he been
similarly situated to the defendant. That, however, says little to nothing
about what the actual defendant intended or thought in the situation that
led him to be on trial in the first place, and it is the defendant’s state of
mind, not someone else’s hypothetical state of mind, that the
prosecution has the burden of proving.
462
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Even if, however, one is not persuaded by the argument that
other witnesses or evidence can effectively rebut the presumption of
intent or knowledge, there is the constitutional right to rest on the
presumption of innocence and the accompanying right to have the
government prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.467 Telling
a jury that it must or can accept a presumed fact if the defendant does
not rebut that fact requires the defendant to “put on a case.” There is
serious tension between requiring a defendant to rebut a presumption
and his right to rely solely on the government satisfying its burden of
proof in order to obtain a conviction. A statutory device that requires a
defendant to put on any evidence to rebut an element of an offense, on
the pain of suffering a conviction if he does not, is a device that
trammels the right against compulsory testimony and the
accompanying right to not have a jury draw an adverse inference if the
defendant does not testify. 468
Finally, there is the well-chronicled reason statutory
presumptions were enacted in the first place: to make it easier for
prosecutors to obtain convictions in cases where proving a defendant’s
state of mind is an element of an offense. 469 No one can quarrel with
the proposition that it is difficult in the extreme to prove someone’s
state of mind if that person cannot be subjected to direct or crossexamination. Intent and state of mind crimes pose quite the dilemma
for prosecutors because they require proof of something only the
defendant actually knows, and prosecutors cannot compel the defendant
to disclose what he knows. It is understandable that some consider this
to be an undue burden on the government. But as Justice Douglas said
in his dissent in Barnes v. United States, “the Bill of Rights was
designed to make the job of the prosecutor difficult.”470
If there is a choice to be made between presumptions that allow
for swifter and easier prosecutions, or a robust respect for the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against compulsory testimony and the
accompanying right to not have a jury draw an adverse inference from
a defendant not testifying, the Fifth Amendment should win every time.
Statutory criminal presumptions that require a defendant to rebut any
467
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element of any offense conflict with these Fifth Amendment
guarantees.
CONCLUSION
Criminal conduct and the devastation it causes “call for the
most vigorous laws … as well as the most powerful efforts to put
[those] vigorous laws into effect.”471 The zeal for “law and order,”
however, too often leads to shortcuts like statutory presumptions that
trammel the constitutional protections that attach to even the most
unpopular and reviled among the citizenry. The Sixth Amendment jury
trial right exists as “a bulwark between the State and the accused.”472
Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment requirement that the government
prove each element of an offense to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is
necessary to give substantive meaning to the presumption of
innocence.473 All of this makes the process of charging, trying, and
convicting a person more difficult, time-consuming, expensive, and
frustrating. None of the foregoing, however, is a constitutionally
permissible reason for diminishing a defendant’s jury trial right,
reducing the government’s burden of proof, or shifting the burden of
proof the defendant. After all, before depriving a person of his life or
liberty, “the State should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting
its accusation to the ‘unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and
neighbours (sic),’ rather than a lone employee of the State.”474
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